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 Taxation of Undocumented 
Immigrants: The Uneasy Connection 
Between Regulating the 
Undocumented Immigrant and 
Fostering Illegal Activity 
Nneka Obiokoye* 
ABSTRACT 
The volume of illegal immigration to the United States has been a raging issue in 
recent years, posing a significant issue for debates during the 2016 presidential elec-
tion and an important policy concern for the Trump administration. Indeed, this 
issue was arguably the strongest point of contention among the 2016 presidential 
candidates and may have largely influenced the results of that election. While the 
recent increase in terrorist activity accounts for some of the controversy, a large part 
of the problem is that the average American believes that undocumented immigrants 
have a parasitical effect on the economy. In other words, they believe that immi-
grants take away from socio-economic infrastructure—such as welfare, health care, 
and education benefits—without contributing to society. Factual evidence tends to 
suggest otherwise, as statistics show that undocumented immigrants do, in fact, con-
tribute a significant amount of federal and state revenue in taxes. 
 
This article seeks to correct some of the negative perceptions held by the general 
public pertaining to undocumented immigrants, by drawing attention to four major 
points. First, contrary to popular belief, undocumented immigrants pay taxes. In-
deed, as this article will show, in many instances, undocumented immigrants pay a 
higher rate of tax than U.S. citizens because the burden of tax on such people tends 
to outweigh the benefits received. Second, undocumented immigrants are human 
beings with the same needs and desires as every other human. Therefore, laws and 
policies that tend to make it impossible for such people to provide basic necessities 
for themselves and their loved ones are not only unfair in the general sense, but they 
also compel such individuals to engage in illegal activity to provide those necessi-
ties. Accordingly, this article argues that the interplay of immigration and employ-
ment laws have the effect of forcing these individuals into a cycle of illegal activity 
out of necessity, whilst enabling better-situated people to exploit them. Third, laws 
aimed at undocumented immigrants often affect American citizens. This is because 
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most undocumented families contain children or dependent relatives who are U.S. 
citizens. Therefore, laws which are unjust or unfair to undocumented immigrants 
are often also unjust and unfair to U.S. citizen members of such families. Finally, 
this article focuses on the interplay between tax and immigration laws that have 
potentially resulted in a legal and regulatory scheme which is driving undocumented 
immigrants to engage in illegal activity, as a matter of necessity. 
 
As its overarching theme, this article considers the issues raised above through the 
lens of signaling—an important component of tax compliance behavior. Signaling 
is used in this context to refer to norm-inducing behavior, particularly those acts or 
omissions by individuals or the government that incentivizes people to pay or not 
to pay taxes. This article argues that policies and laws seeking to integrate undocu-
mented immigrants into the larger society are more beneficial to the tax system and 
the economy as a whole than a zero-tolerance strategy. Since government behavior 
has a signaling effect that influences tax compliance, this article argues that the 
government can achieve more constructive results in tax and immigration law en-
forcement while simultaneously discouraging illegal activity if it adopts positive 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Silvia is the first of six children.1 Born in a rural village in India, she migrated 
to the United States in 2010 on a student visa to pursue an associate degree in par-
alegal studies. Sylvia remained in the United States since then, even though her visa 
expired. Silvia’s degree is not advanced enough to enable her to obtain work au-
thorization or any extension of her immigration documents on her own. Six years 
after her original entry, Silvia’s savings are exhausted. Without work authorization 
or access to unemployment benefits, she has no idea how she will earn a living. She 
does not dare go home, for she will likely not be permitted to re-enter the United 
States. Yet, she cannot afford to remain for much longer without some form of in-
come. 
Aisha is in a similar position as Silvia.2 However, Aisha is a high school drop-
out who immigrated to the United States from Libya with her husband, Philip, and 
her son, Moussa, on non-immigrant visas. They immigrated with hopes that they 
could somehow rectify their immigration status and make life easier for their fam-
ily. At the time of their migration, things were difficult in Libya, with a high rate of 
inflation, and frequent violent clashes between pro-government groups and the re-
sistance. While in the United States, Aisha had twin children, Michael and Mardea. 
Michael and Mardea are both United States citizens,3 although the rest of their fam-
ily remains undocumented with long expired non-immigrant visas. 
Aisha and Silvia are prototypes of the average undocumented immigrant.4 An 
undocumented immigrant is a person who is in the United States without lawful 
permission, possibly because they overstayed their non-immigrant visa or entered 
the United States either without travel documents or with falsified documents.5 The 
Pew Research Center estimates there are about 11 million undocumented immi-
grants in the United States as of 2014.6 
In the ideal tax world, where every person is held accountable for the purposes 
of taxation, all 11 million undocumented immigrants would pay taxes.7 In the ideal 
legal world, where all laws are enforced, none of the 11 million would pay any taxes 
because all 11 million would be detained, deported, or forced into a state of hiding 
where they would be outside the reach of law enforcement.8 Assume that, like the 
                                                          
 1. Silvia is a hypothetical person used for imagery purposes only. 
 2. Aisha is a hypothetical person used for imagery purposes only. 
 3. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 4. Jie Zong, Jeanne Batalova & Jeffrey Hallock, Frequently Requested Statistics on Immigrants and 
Immigration in the United States, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.migrationpol-
icy.org/article/frequently-requested-statistics-immigrants-and-immigration-united-states#Demo-
graphic. 
 5. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42628, ABILITY OF UNAUTHORIZED ALIENS TO CLAIM REFUNDABLE 
TAX CREDITS 4 (2012) [hereinafter ABILITY OF UNAUTHORIZED ALIENS]. 
 6. Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, Overall Number of U.S. Unauthorized Immigrants Holds Steady 
Since 2009, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 20, 2016), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2016/09/20/overall-number-
of-u-s-unauthorized-immigrants-holds-steady-since-2009/. 
 7. This is a fictitious idea created for analogy purposes and to enhance the reader’s understanding of 
the article. 
 8. This is a fictitious idea created for analogy purposes and to enhance the reader’s understanding of 
the article. 
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United States, the government of such ideal tax world largely relies on self-report-
ing9 for tax collection, and audit rates are similarly low among lower income brack-
ets. The interplay of tax and immigration laws in the ideal legal world would disin-
centivize undocumented immigrants from paying taxes, either because of the in-
creased risk of apprehension or merely because tax payment would be of no real 
benefit.10 Popular opinion in the United States currently assumes this “ideal legal 
world” scenario.11 Fortunately, in the United States, the real world is a cross be-
tween the ideal tax world and the ideal legal world. Current United States tax laws 
enable all persons to remit their taxes regardless of immigration status, although 
immigration laws may still affect a person’s willingness to do so.12 
Part II of this article considers the basic incidence of taxation on the undocu-
mented immigrant. That part will provide the necessary background for this article’s 
argument that undocumented immigrants not only pay taxes, but have a higher rate 
of compliance than other people, despite their relatively low audit rate in the U.S.13 
Part III will consider compliance issues arising in connection with the taxation of 
undocumented immigrants, signaling considerations affecting such compliance, 
and the effect of federal agency cooperation on such compliance. 
Part IV will examine some of the possible tax and social security revenue ben-
efits enjoyed by undocumented immigrants to determine whether such benefits out-
weigh the economic burden of federal tax. Part V will delve into efficiency and 
fairness considerations raised by the “Undocumented Immigrant Tax,” a term used 
to describe the additional tax on undocumented immigrants occurring as a result of 
the imbalance between the burden and the benefits created by the tax system.14  
Finally, Part VI will consider the connection between taxation of undocu-
mented immigrants and illegal activity. In other words, do current tax and immigra-
tion laws increase illegal activity on the part of undocumented immigrants and peo-
ple with whom they relate? 
II. TAXING THE IMMIGRANT 
The following subparts will examine the extent to which undocumented immi-
grants are taxed, how such taxes are reported, and how compliance is enforced. 
Among other things, these subparts will show that, contrary to public opinion, un-
documented immigrants contribute a significant amount in federal and state taxes 
even when they do not have traditional incentives to do so. 
                                                          
 9. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6011 (2018); Alan H. Plumley, The Impact of the IRS on Voluntary Tax Com-
pliance: Preliminary Empirical Results, IRS NAT’L HEADQUARTERS OFF. OF RES. (2002), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/irsvtc.pdf; J.T. Manhire, What Does Voluntary Tax Compliance Mean?: 
A Government Perspective, 164 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 11, 15 (2015), https://scholarship.law.up-
enn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? 
article=1154&context=penn_law_review_online. 
 10. See Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 1781, 
1783 (2000) (discussing how social norms affect compliance with tax laws). 
 11. Alexia Fernández Campbell, Undocumented Immigrants Pay Billions of Dollars in Federal Taxes 
Each Year, VOX, https://www.vox.com/2018/4/13/17229018/undocumented-immigrants-pay-taxes (last 
updated Oct. 25, 2018, 2:15 PM). 
 12. See Part III.D.i. 
 13. See Posner, supra note 10, at 1783–84. 
 14. See infra Part V. 
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A. Income Taxes 
When economists discuss the incidence of taxation, they refer to the person 
who bears the true burden of a tax and is worse off due to its imposition.15 Therefore, 
with respect to the personal income tax, the worker bears the direct burden.16 Recall 
the “ideal tax world” and “ideal legal world” analogies raised above. The ideal tax 
world looks to maximize revenue with the least amount of deadweight loss.17 This 
means that the ideal tax world would seek to impose some sort of tax status on all 
persons, regardless of their immigrant status. This would enable the tax system to 
capture, to the highest extent possible, all income within its borders.18 In this ideal 
tax world, both Aisha and Sylvia would immediately become subject to income 
taxes on any earned income, regardless of the source. However, they will not nec-
essarily benefit from any credits or allowances under ideal tax world laws unless 
such credits or allowances are not tied to immigration status or documents. 
Current United States federal income tax laws are fashioned to reflect the con-
cept of the ideal tax world with respect to taxation regardless of immigration sta-
tus.19 Accordingly, the Internal Revenue Code20 (“the Code”) imposes taxation on 
all persons present in the United States, regardless of their immigration status.21 The 
only personal distinction made by the Code is its treatment of resident and non-
resident aliens.22 A resident alien is a person who is either recognized as a United 
States resident by virtue of permanent residency classification23 or as anyone who 
has resided in the United States for a given period of time based on the substantial 
                                                          
 15. DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, DECODING THE U.S. CORPORATE TAX 59 (Kathleen Courrier et al. eds., 
2009). 
 16. See Daniel S. Goldberg, E-Tax: Fundamental Tax Reform and the Transition to A Currency-Free 
Economy, 20 VA. TAX REV. 1, 13 (2000) (discussing how workers bear the cost of tax incidence). 
 17. LAURIE L. MALMAN ET AL., THE INDIVIDUAL TAX BASE: CASES, PROBLEMS AND POLICIES IN 
FEDERAL TAXATION 9, 11 (2d ed. 2002). This occurs when a tax imposed on goods or services causes a 
negative change in behavior (usually a reduction in demand for such goods or services) and a resultant 
loss in productive output, and the net receipts to the government (as a result of that tax) is smaller than 
the loss in productive output. For instance, if the government imposes a tax on oranges that makes people 
stop buying oranges, neither the orange sellers, nor the people who stopped buying oranges, nor the 
government will benefit since there will be no receipts in taxes due to the lack of a market for oranges. 
See also Julia Kagen, Deadweight Loss of Taxation, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.in-
vestopedia.com/terms/d/deadweight-loss-of-taxation.asp (last updated May 2, 2018). 
 18. Thomas D. Griffith, Should “Tax Norms” Be Abandoned? Rethinking Tax Policy Analysis and 
the Taxation of Personal Injury Recoveries, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 1115, 1151 (1993) (most tax scholars 
have adopted the Haigs-Simon definition of income. Under the Haig-Simons formulation, economic 
“income is defined as the sum of an individual’s consumption plus change in wealth during a specified 
period.”); Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at 
Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905, 1909 n.9 (1987). However, most tax systems are unable to 
strictly enforce this definition of income, because of the administrative difficulty of tracking all aspects 
of income. Particularly where they are negligible, where public policy dictates against taxation, or where 
such income cannot easily be measured in monetary terms. See id. at 1909–10. 
 19. I.R.C. § 6012 (2018) (the Federal Income Tax Code requires that returns with respect to income 
taxes shall be made by “every individual having for the taxable year gross income . . . .”); see also I.R.C. 
§ 6011(b) (2018); I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A)–(B) (2018). 
 20. I.R.C. § 26 (2012). 
 21. See I.R.C. § 6011(a); I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A)–(B). 
 22. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A)–(B). 
 23. This is also known as the “green card.” See Green Card, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., 
https://www.uscis.gov/greencard (last updated Feb. 22, 2018). 
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presence test.24 A non-resident alien is any other person who cannot be taxed as a 
resident.25 Both resident and non-resident aliens are subject to federal taxation; the 
only distinction is that the former is taxed on their worldwide income, while the 
latter is generally taxed only on United States source income.26 
Given that most undocumented immigrants intend to remain in the United 
States permanently,27 it is safe to say that, if tax laws are applied as intended, every 
undocumented immigrant will be taxed as a resident alien.28 
Now, consider Silvia, from above. If United States tax laws are applied as in-
tended, Silvia will be taxed on all of her earnings, regardless of her immigration 
status.29 This means that if Silvia earns a salary,  some part of it will be subject to 
withholding,30 and, at the end of the tax year, Silvia will file a return and claim any 
refunds due to excess withholding.31 If Silvia starts up her own business, she will 
also have to file a tax return for her business earnings.32 
The data on the amount of actual federal income tax collected from undocu-
mented immigrants is sparse due to the Internal Revenue Service’s (“IRS”) data 
sharing restrictions.33 However, the Office of the Chief Actuary of the Social Secu-
rity Administration (“OCACT”) estimates that there were “about 3.1 million un-
documented immigrants working and paying social security taxes in the United 
States in 2010.”34 Assuming that income tax is also withheld from the same 
                                                          
 24. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A), (b)(3) (stating that a person is a resident alien under the substantial pres-
ence test “if such individual was present in the United States on at least 31 days during the calendar year, 
and” for at least 183 days during the current year and the 2 preceding calendar years. In computing the 
183-day period, a formula is used which calculates all qualifying days of the present year, one-third of 
the qualifying days of the preceding year, and one-sixth for the second preceding year). 
 25. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(B). 
 26. Id.; see also Taxation of Nonresident Aliens, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/taxation-of-nonresident-aliens-1 (last updated June 5, 2018). 
 27. James Bachmeier & Jennifer Van Hook, Profile of the Unauthorized Population: United States, 
MIGRATION POLICY INST. (2014), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/data/unauthorized-immigrant-popu-
lation/state/US (showing that as of 2014, about 66% of the adult unauthorized population had been in 
the U.S. for at least a decade, with a median of 13.6 years; one-third of undocumented immigrants 15 
and older lives with at least one child who is a United States citizen by birth; and slightly more than 30% 
own homes); see also Jens Manuel Krogstad, Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, 5 Facts about Illegal 
Immigration in the U.S., PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 27, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2017/04/27/5-facts-about-illegal-immigration-in-the-u-s/; Vivian Yee, Kenan Davis & Jugal K. Pa-
tel, Here’s the Reality About Illegal Immigrants in the United States, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/03/06/us/politics/undocumented-illegal-immigrants.html. 
 28. Because they will have passed the substantial presence test. See Yee, Davis & Patel, supra note 
27; see also 4 Tax Laws that Affect Immigrants, E-FILE.COM, https://www.e-file.com/faq/immigration-
and-taxes.php (last visited Oct. 25, 2018) (stating that “[w]hen immigrants file taxes with the IRS, they 
must report their worldwide income.”). 
 29. See Joey Palacios, Immigrants in the U.S. Illegally Pay Taxes and File Returns Without Fear of 
Deportation, KWBU MARKETPLACE (Apr. 15, 2015), http://www.kwbu.org/post/immigrants-us-ille-
gally-pay-taxes-and-file-returns-without-fear-deportation#stream/0 (stating that “[r]egardless of citizen-
ship status, the IRS requires everyone earning income in the United States to report it.”). See generally 
I.R.C. § 61(a) (2017). 
 30. I.R.C. § 3402 (2017). 
 31. I.R.C. § 6401 (2017); I.R.C. § 6511 (2018). 
 32. I.R.C. § 61(a)(2). 
 33. See I.R.C. § 6103 (2018); I.R.C. § 6108 (1976). 
 34. Stephen Goss et al., Effects of Unauthorized Immigration on the Actuarial Status of the Social 
Security Trust Funds, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. ACTUARIAL NOTE NUMBER 151, 3 (Apr. 2013), 
https://www.ssa.gov/oact/NOTES/pdf_notes/note151.pdf. 
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paychecks,35 then roughly 3.1 million undocumented immigrants paid federal in-
come tax in 2010. State and local taxes attributable to the undocumented immigrant 
population are estimated at $11.64 billion a year.36 “This includes more than $6.9 
billion in sales and excise taxes, $3.6 billion in property taxes, and just under $1.1 
billion in personal income taxes.”37 “Contributions range from almost $2.2 million 
in Montana to more than $3.1 billion in California.”38 
While this article primarily focuses on federal income and payroll tax contri-
butions from undocumented immigrants, the above statistics are instructive. They 
suggest that in the real world, undocumented immigrants pay both federal and state 
taxes, which contributes a substantial amount to the government’s revenue on all 
levels. In addition, as will be seen in Part IV, a large portion of income and payroll 
taxes withheld at source are unclaimed by the applicable undocumented immigrants 
due to the compliance issues. Accordingly, it seems that the above statistics un-
derrepresent the actual extent of undocumented immigrant tax contributions to the 
United States economy. Similar considerations with respect to payroll taxes are dis-
cussed below. 
B. Payroll Taxes 
In much the same way that they bear the incidence of income tax,39 workers 
bear the direct cost of income and employee payroll taxes withheld at source,40 as 
they are both directly related to compensation.41 Some argue that workers bear the 
burden of employer contributions to payroll taxes, since it is likely that these costs 
are indirectly passed on to workers through a reduction in wages.42 
Like income taxes, payroll taxes are means by which funds are pooled into 
federal and state coffers for use in funding socio-economic infrastructure.43 Con-
trary to its name, payroll taxes are not limited to employees. These taxes and con-
tributions are structured such that both employers and employees contribute a per-
centage of the said levies.44 In this regard, a self-employed person would be required 
to contribute both the employer’s and the employee’s portion of the taxes.45 
                                                          
 35. See Tax Withholding for Individuals, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Apr. 12, 2018), 
https://www.irs.gov/individuals/employees/tax-withholding [hereinafter Tax Withholding for Individu-
als] (noting that some employees “can claim exemption from” income tax withholding, but not payroll 
tax withholding, by showing that (1) “for the prior year, [they] had a right to a refund of all federal 
income tax withheld because [they] had no tax liability” and (2) “for the current year, [they] expect a 
refund of all federal income tax withheld because [they] expect to have no tax liability.”). 
 36. Lisa Christensen Gee et al., Undocumented Immigrants’ State & Local Tax Contributions, INST. 
ON TAX’N & ECON. POL’Y 1, https://itep.org/wp-content/uploads/immigration2016.pdf (last updated 
Feb. 2016). 
 37. Id. at 2. 
 38. Id. at 1. 
 39. See supra Part II.A; see also Goldberg, supra note 16. 
 40. This means that tax is deducted from the employee’s paycheck before the employee receives pay-
ment, and directly remitted to the government by the employer. See Tax Withholding for Individuals, 
supra note 35. 
 41. See Kyle Pomerleau, A Comparison of the Tax Burden on Labor in the OECD, TAX FOUND. (June 
19, 2014), http://taxfoundation.org/article/comparison-tax-burden-labor-oecd. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. Such as Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid and food stamps. 
 44. I.R.C. § 3101 (2018). 
 45. Id. 
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The Federal Insurance Contributions Act (“FICA”) is the primary payroll tax 
statute.46 The FICA imposes a 7.65% tax on all employment wages,47 which is re-
quired to be withheld at source.48 Revenue realized from FICA contributions is ap-
plied towards Medicare, social security, and similar benefits.49 As previously men-
tioned, many economists believe that the incidence of employer contributions to 
payroll taxes falls on the employee.50 This means that in addition to the 7.65% tax 
on their wages, employees bear the burden of the employer’s portion of the payroll 
tax by indirectly contributing the additional 7.65% tax levied on their employers on 
the same wages.51 Assuming this is true, then employees, including undocumented 
immigrants, pay an effective payroll tax rate of 15.3%.52 Undocumented immigrants 
who own their own businesses will also pay the same 15.3% rate as self-employ-
ment taxes.53 Due to restrictions under the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(“INA”),  many undocumented immigrants like Sylvia will end up paying the full 
15.3% rate, since they are less likely to find traditional white or blue-collar employ-
ment, and are forced to set up cash-based businesses to avoid the relevant work 
authorization requirements.54 
The OCACT estimates that “the average amount of” social security taxable 
earnings from undocumented immigrants, as of 2010, was “about 80[%] of the av-
erage level for all workers,”55 and that roughly $13 billion was collected in payroll 
taxes from unauthorized immigrant workers and their employers.56 The OCACT 
also “estimate[s] that the excess of tax revenue paid to the [social security] Trust 
Funds over benefits paid from these funds based on earnings of unauthorized work-
ers [in 2010, was] about $12 billion.”57 This means that as of 2010, undocumented 
immigrants contributed about $13 billion to payroll taxes, but only claimed $1 bil-
lion in benefits.58 
There are various reasons why the amount of payroll taxes contributed by these 
immigrants will exceed benefits collected, and these are discussed in Part V. How-
ever, if this trend continues, as predicted by the OCACT, undocumented immigrant 
workers will continue to have a net positive effect on the United States economy.59 
                                                          
 46. Id. 
 47. See Amanda Dixon, All About the FICA Tax, SMARTASSET (Nov. 16, 2018), 
https://smartasset.com/taxes/all-about-the-fica-tax; see also § 3101 (requiring an additional tax of 0.9% 
is imposed on wages exceeding 200,000 for single taxpayers and $250,000 for married filing jointly). 
 48. I.R.C. § 3102 (2010). 
 49. § 3101. 
 50. Pomerleau, supra note 41. 
 51. See I.R.C. § 3111 (2018) (requiring employers to pay an aggregate of 7.65% tax on the wages of 
each employee); see also Dixon, supra note 47. 
 52. Francine J. Lipman, The “Illegal” Tax, 11 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 93, 103 (2011). 
 53. I.R.C. § 1401 (2014) (requiring an additional 0.9% tax on self-employment income above 
$200,000 for single taxpayers and $250,000 for married taxpayers). 
 54. The Immigration and Reform Control Act requires proof of work authorization in order to secure 
employment. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2004). 
 55. Goss et al., supra note 34, at 3. 
 56. Gee et al., supra note 36, at 2–3. 
 57. Goss et al., supra note 34, at 2. 
 58. Alexia Fernández Campbell, The Truth About Undocumented Immigrants and Taxes, ATLANTIC 
(Sept. 12, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/09/undocumented-immigrants-
and-taxes/499604/. 
 59. Goss et al., supra note 34, at 3. 
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The next part considers how federal agencies enforce tax obligations on undoc-
umented immigrants, as well as some of the problems and normative considerations 
associated with the current compliance system. 
III. COMPLIANCE 
Having examined the incidence of federal taxation on undocumented immi-
grants, the next step is to consider how the relevant taxes are collected. The first 
subpart will consider self-reporting and employee withholding as an important 
means of tax enforcement within the United States, and how such compliance mech-
anisms play out with respect to the undocumented immigrant population. Subse-
quently, this article focuses on signaling—an important element of tax compli-
ance—and discusses how government policies and interagency cooperation could 
affect compliance on the part of undocumented immigrant taxpayers. 
A. Self-Reporting 
The United States federal tax system primarily relies on self-reporting for tax 
enforcement, and the tax audit is the principal method of ensuring compliance.60 
However, as most scholars on compliance have noted, the audit rate in the United 
States is actually very low and decreases significantly at lower income levels.61 For 
instance, in 2015 the IRS audited 0.8% of individual income tax returns, with a 
significant part of that number being returns with income above $1,000,000.62 In 
2016, the IRS reported an audit rate of 0.6%, a 0.28% drop from the previous year.63 
In view of the low audit rate, one would assume that undocumented immigrants 
would have little or no motivation to report their income. However, the following 
statistics suggest that they do report their income. In 2005, 1.55 million people filed 
tax returns using an Individual Tax Identification Number (“ITIN”), a number as-
signed to foreign nationals and other people who do not have a social security num-
ber (“SSN”).64 In 2010, over 3 million tax returns were filed using an ITIN.65 While 
these numbers could reflect other categories of people who are not necessarily un-
documented immigrants, the IRS and other government entities recognize that un-
documented immigrants make up a substantial portion of ITIN users.66 In addition, 
the actual number of undocumented immigrant filings could be larger, as these sta-
tistics do not capture the population of undocumented immigrants who paid their 
                                                          
 60. Posner, supra note 10, at 1783–84; see also I.R.C. § 6303 (1976). 
 61. Chances for a Tax Audit Have Rarely Been this Low, CNBC, 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/06/chances-for-a-tax-audit-have-rarely-been-this-low.html (last up-
dated Mar. 6, 2017, 9:18 AM). 
 62. Scott Greenberg, The IRS Audited 1.2 Million Households in 2015, TAX FOUND. (Mar. 31, 2016), 
https://taxfoundation.org/irs-audited-12-million-households-2015/. 
 63. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2016 IRS DATABOOK 21 (2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
soi/16databk.pdf. 
 64. ABILITY OF UNAUTHORIZED ALIENS, supra note 5, at 1. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See Laura E. Hill & Hans P. Johnson, Unauthorized Immigrants in California: Estimates for Coun-
ties, PUB. POL’Y INST. CAL. 10–11 (July 2011), http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/re-
port/R_711LHR.pdf; Associated Press, Illegal Immigrants Filing Taxes More Than Ever, NBC NEWS 
(April 13, 2007, 6:37 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/18077009/ns/business-personal_finance/t/ille-
gal-immigrants-filing-taxes-more-ever/#.W7yWs9Mvz-Y.\ 
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taxes through other means, like using a SSN obtained under an expired non-immi-
grant visa.67 
Accordingly, despite the small audit numbers for low income earners—the cat-
egory most undocumented immigrants fall into—undocumented immigrants tend 
to have a high rate of compliance.68 One of the reasons for such compliance is fear 
of the consequences of a tax audit69—particularly, fear of civil or criminal prosecu-
tion that could lead to deportation.70 
Another reason for the high rate of compliance is that failure to comply with 
tax laws is considered by the courts to be a substantial factor that weighs against an 
immigrant in deportation hearings.71 For instance, in Kawashima v. Holder, the 
United States Supreme Court upheld a removal order for resident aliens Akio and 
Fusako Kawashima based on prior convictions for “willfully making and subscrib-
ing a false tax return” and “aiding and assisting in the preparation of a false tax 
return.”72 In its opinion, the Court noted that, because both crimes relied on deceit, 
they were deportable offenses.73 An important fact of the Kawashima case was that 
it involved a loss to the government of $10,000 or more, which made it an aggra-
vated felony, and therefore a deportable offense.74 However, even if the loss to the 
government is smaller, failing to file or falsifying income on a tax return is still a 
felony under the Code.75 In any case, such tax behavior amounts to fraud or deceit 
and, therefore, is a crime involving “moral turpitude” for which deportation is per-
mitted.76 
Compliance with tax laws is also an important factor considered by immigra-
tion authorities for the purpose of determining eligibility to convert from undocu-
mented to documented immigrant status.77 For instance, immigrants who intend to 
become citizens of the United States through naturalization are required to show,                                                           
 67. See Hill & Johnson, supra note 66, at 11; see also Goss et al., supra note 34. 
 68. Impact of Unauthorized Immigrants on the Budgets of State and Local Governments, CONG. 
BUDGET OFF 6–7 (Dec. 2007), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/110th-congress-2007-2008/re-
ports/12-6-immigration.pdf. 
 69. See I.R.C. § 7201 (1982) (providing that the penalty for tax evasion is a fine of “not more than 
$100,000 ($500,000 in the case of a corporation), or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both, 
together with the costs of prosecution.”). 
 70. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2008) (setting out various grounds for deportation, including crimes involv-
ing fraud or moral turpitude). 
 71. Id.; see Carty v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that “willful failure to file 
a tax return, with the intent to evade taxes, involves fraud, and thus constitutes a crime of moral turpi-
tude,” which could subject an alien to removal). See, e.g., Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478, 480 
(2012) (holding that individuals who commit tax crimes may be subject to deportation); Jordan v. De 
George, 341 U.S. 223, 232 (1951) (stating that crimes involving fraud inherently involve “moral turpi-
tude”). 
 72. 565 U.S. at 484. 
 73. Id. at 484–85. 
 74. Id. at 484; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i)–(ii) (2014) (defining an “aggravated felony” as 
a “felony described in [§] 7201 of Title 26 (relating to tax evasion) in which the revenue loss to the 
Government exceeds $10,000.”). 
 75. 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1982). 
 76. Carty, 395 F.3d at 1085. 
 77. See Tessa Davis, The Tax-Immigration Nexus, 94 DENVER L. R. 195, 217 (2017) (this would apply 
for instance, to an undocumented immigrant who marries a citizen or permanent resident; or otherwise 
qualifies for legal documentation through an employer or other filing for applicable visas and work au-
thorization). See also CONG. RES. SERV., supra note 5, at 8 (noting that there was a 246% increase in tax 
reporting by undocumented immigrants when reform bills were introduced in “the 2000s that would 
have required [undocumented immigrants] to demonstrate that they had paid taxes if they sought legali-
zation or ‘amnesty.’”). 
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among other things, that they have filed their tax returns in the preceding five 
years.78 The Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Res-
idents (“DAPA”),79 which was rescinded in 2017, and the Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”),80 established by executive action under the office 
of the Secretary of Homeland Security,81 are good examples of policies that condi-
tion deferred action,82 or relief from deportation, to undocumented immigrants on 
compliance with laws—including tax laws. 
To request consideration for deferred action under DAPA, an undocumented 
immigrant is required to show the following: 
 As of November 20, 2014, he/she is the parent of a U.S. citizen or 
lawful permanent resident; 
 He/she has continuously resided in the U.S. since before January 1, 
2010; 
 He/she has been physically present in the U.S. on the date of the mem-
orandum (November 20, 2014) and when applying for relief; 
 He/she has no lawful immigration status on that date; 
 He/she does not fall within the Secretary’s enforcement priorities;83 and 
                                                          
 78. Applying for Citizenship? What to Know and Bring to Your Naturalization Interview, U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES (Oct. 21, 2013), https://www.uscis.gov/archive/blog/2013/10/apply-
ing-for-citizenship-what-to-know. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, FORM N-400, 
APPLICATION FOR NATURALIZATION PART 12, §§ 6–8, https://www.uscis.gov/n-400. 
 79. The Obama Administration’s DAPA and Expanded DACA Programs, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR., 
https://www.nilc.org/issues/immigration-reform-and-executive-actions/dapa-and-expanded-daca-pro-
grams/ [hereinafter NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR.] (last updated Mar. 2, 2015); U.S. DEPT. HOMELAND 
SECURITY, RESCISSION OF MEMORANDUM PROVIDING FOR DEFERRED ACTION FOR PARENTS OF 
AMERICANS AND LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENTS (“DAPA”) (2017), 
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/06/15/rescission-memorandum-providing-deferred-action-parents-
americans-and-lawful. 
 80. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and Deferred Action for Parents of Americans 
and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA), U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (July 24, 2017), 
https://www.ice.gov/daca. 
 81. DAPA in particular was considered a landmark executive action under the Obama administration. 
See Jessica A. Schulberg, President Obama’s DAPA Executive Action: Ephemeral or Enduring?, 57 
ARIZ. L. REV. 623, 624 (2015). 
 82. NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR., supra note 79. 
 83. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Leon Rodriguez, 
Dir., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs 
Enf’t, & R. Gil Kerlikowske, Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot. 4 (Nov. 20, 2014), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action_1.pdf; see also 
Memorandum from John Morton, Dir. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t (Mar. 2, 2011), 
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2011/110302washingtondc.pdf (the Memorandum sets out 
three levels or priority for removal of aliens including: conviction for a felony or aggravated felony 
(classified as highest priority); three or more misdemeanors, or a significant misdemeanor (defined spe-
cifically for this purpose as domestic violence, sexual abuse or exploitation) (mid priority); and aliens 
who have been issued a final order of removal on or after January 1, 2014 (lowest priority)). 
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 There are no other factors that, in the exercise of discretion, make the 
grant of deferred action inappropriate.84 
Similarly, applicants under DACA and the DACA expansion85 are required to 
show that they have satisfied the following: 
 He/she came to the United States under the age of 16; 
 He/she has continuously resided in the United States for at least five 
years preceding the date of the memorandum and is present in the 
United States on the date of the memorandum (June 15, 2012); 
 He/she is currently in school, has graduated from high school, has 
obtained a general education development certificate, or is an honor-
ably discharged veteran of the Coast Guard or Armed Forces of the 
United States; 
 He/she has not been convicted of a felony offense, a significant mis-
demeanor offense, multiple misdemeanor offenses, or otherwise 
poses a threat to national security or public safety;86 and 
 He/she is not above the age of 30.87 
As seen above, both DACA and DAPA condition eligibility for deferred action 
on the applicant’s exclusion from the “enforcement priorities.”88 Because tax eva-
sion is a felony under the Code89 and an aggravated felony under the INA90 (in cases 
where the loss to the government is $10,000 or more), any undocumented immi-
grant convicted of either offense would necessarily fall within the highest enforce-
ment priority and thereby would become ineligible for deferred action under DAPA 
or DACA.91 Unfortunately, the DAPA program was never implemented due to a 
federal court injunction92 and a United States Supreme Court deadlock on the issue, 
                                                          
 84. Johnson, supra note 83, at 4. 
 85. Id. at 3 (the DAPA Memorandum sought to expand the category of people eligible for deferred 
action under DACA). 
 86. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to David V. Aguilar, 
Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigra-
tion Servs., & John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t 1 (June 15, 2012), 
https://www.dhs.gov/publication/memorandum-deferred-action-process-young-people-who-are-low-
enforcement-priorities; see also Johnson, supra note 83 (these are also set out in the enforcement prior-
ities). 
 87. Napolitano, supra note 86, at 1. 
 88. Johnson, supra note 83, at 3. 
 89. I.R.C. § 7201 (1982). 
 90. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(ii) (2014). 
 91. See Morton, supra note 83, at 1–2 (making the removal of aliens convicted of any felony the 
highest priority for removal); Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478, 484–85 (2012) (noting that offenses 
carrying losses of more than $10,000 rise to the level of aggravated felony); 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(43)(M)(i). 
 92. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), 
aff’d by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). 
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which served to affirm the decision of the lower court.93 Subsequently, in 2017, the 
current administration issued a formal statement rescinding the DAPA program al-
together.94 The DACA program, on the other hand, seems to have been preserved 
in its old form without the expansion provided in the executive order establishing 
DAPA,95 although the current government appears to be taking steps towards ex-
tinguishing the program altogether.96 However, until the DACA program is com-
pletely proscribed, beneficiaries of the program would still need to show compli-
ance with laws—including tax laws—in order to qualify for work authorization or 
extensions of existing work authorizations.97 
Evidence of tax compliance is often required by immigration authorities to 
show “good moral character” in adjustment of status processes, naturalization pro-
ceedings, and proceedings relating to cancellation of removal.98 For instance, the 
Second Circuit has held that filing amended income tax returns during a cancella-
tion of removal proceeding may not mitigate the negative impression caused by 
previously filing an inaccurate return.99 Because of this, undocumented immigrants, 
particularly small business owners, engage in self-reporting as a sign of good faith 
compliance with the law.100 
Another strong incentive for tax compliance is that banks and other financial 
institutions require applicants to show proof of tax payment to obtain financing.101 
Many undocumented immigrants, like most people, will want to eventually own 
their own home and purchase personal property, most of which will require some                                                           
 93. United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272, reh’g denied, 137 S. Ct. 285 (2016); see also Con-
sideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), US CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES 12 
(Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/archive/consideration-deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca 
[hereinafter DACA Information]. 
 94. See Memorandum from John F. Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to James W. McCa-
ment, Acting Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services, Thomas D. Homan, Acting Dir., U.S. Im-
migration & Customs Enf’t, Joseph B. Maher, Acting Gen. Couns., & Kevin K. McAleenan, Acting 
Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot. 2 (June 15, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publi-
cations/DAPA%20Cancellation%20Memo.pdf; see also Daniel M. Kowalski, DHS Sec. Kelly Rescinds 
DAPA Memo, Leaves DACA Alone...For Now, LEXISNEXIS: LEGAL NEWSROOM (June 16, 2017), 
https://www.lexisnexis.com/LegalNewsRoom/immigration/b/immigration-law-blog/posts/dhs-sec-
kelly-rescinds-dapa-memo-leaves-daca-alone-for-now; Josh Gerstein, Trump Won’t Alter Status of Cur-
rent Dreamers, POLITICO (June 15, 2017, 11:06 PM), http://www.polit-
ico.com/story/2017/06/15/trump-immigration-dreamers-status-239621. 
 95. Kelly, supra note 94, at 2. 
 96. See DACA Information, supra note 93. 
 97. See Frequently Asked Questions: Rescission of Memorandum Providing for Deferred Action for 
Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (“DAPA”), U.S. DEPT. HOMELAND SEC. (June 
15, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/06/15/frequently-asked-questions-rescission-memorandum-
providing-deferred-action-parents. 
 98. See also Immigration and Taxation, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (2014), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/20-Immigration%20and%20Taxation.pdf [hereinafter IRS Presenta-
tion]; see, e.g., Dominguez-Capistran v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 808, 811 n.1 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 99. See, e.g., Sumbundu v. Holder, 602 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 100. See Maria Sacchetti, Undocumented and Paying Taxes, They Seek a Foothold in the American 
Dream, WASH. POST (Mar. 11, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/social-issues/undocu-
mented-and-paying-taxes-they-seek-a-foothold-in-the-american-dream/2017/03/11/bc6a8760-0436-
11e7-ad5b-d22680e18d10_story.html?utm_term=.4afeeeb46025; Octavio Blanco, Why Undocumented 
Immigrants Pay Taxes, CNN (Apr. 19, 2017, 6:06 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2017/04/19/news/econ-
omy/undocumented-immigrant-taxes/index.html. 
 101. See, e.g., John Kuo, 7 Documents You Need When Applying for a Home Loan, CREDIT KARMA 
(Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.creditkarma.com/home-loans/i/home-loan-documents; What Documents 
Are Part of the Mortgage Process?, U.S. BANK, https://www.usbank.com/home-loans/mortgage/first-
time-home-buyers/mortgage-process.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2018) [hereinafter U.S. BANK]. 
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form of financing. However, the extent to which undocumented immigrants may 
actually obtain financing will be limited by other factors,102 and such individuals 
will need to take the necessary steps to ensure compliance with tax laws in order to 
obtain the records required for such financing.103 
A final incentive for undocumented immigrants to self-report is that refundable 
tax credits are generally only claimed by persons who file their income tax re-
turns.104 Certain credits, such as the Additional Child Tax Credit,105 remain availa-
ble to undocumented immigrants. Although, the availability of these credits is sub-
stantially restricted for undocumented immigrants under relevant sections of the 
Code106 and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
of 1996.107  The desire to claim these available credits could serve as another strong 
incentive for undocumented immigrants to self-report. 
B. Employee Withholding 
A significant degree of compliance with United States tax laws is procured 
through the employee tax withholding system; employers withhold applicable in-
come and payroll taxes at source, and employees file an income tax return at the 
end of the fiscal year to either pay any shortfalls in tax, or to receive surpluses in 
withheld income.108 Current trends support over-withholding of income, because 
most taxpayers prefer to receive a refund rather than preserve an obligation to make 
up shortfalls.109 
In this regard, Sylvia would be subject to withholding if she somehow procured 
a job after her non-immigrant documents expired by using a SSN obtained as a 
student on F1 status.110 Likewise, if Aisha establishes her own house cleaning busi-
ness, for example, she would be subject to withholdings to the extent that she is 
employed by any person who is under a requirement to withhold taxes and remit 
them directly to the IRS.                                                           
 102. See Kuo, supra note 101 (including having a credit history or a guarantor). 
 103. Id. 
 104. See Ryan Yergensen, Childcare Credits Versus Deduction: An Efficiency Analysis, 22 TEX. REV. 
L. & POL. 571, 589 (2018). Cf. Lily L. Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for 
Refundable Tax Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 33 (2006) (refundable tax credits offset the tax liabilities 
of a taxpayer, and include a “refundable [component,] meaning that the tax payer may be paid in cash 
when there is no federal income tax liability to offset.”). 
 105. I.R.C. § 24 (2018) (establishing a refundable tax credit for parents of children below the age of 17 
at certain income levels). 
 106. I.R.C. § 32(c)(1)(D) (2018); I.R.C. § 36(d)(1) (2010). 
 107. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–193, 
§§ 401(a), 431, 110 Stat. 2105. 
 108. I.R.C. § 3402 (2017). 
 109. See Adam Shell, Workers Overwithholding: Tax Refunds Could Jump 26% Next Year, New Report 
Claims, USA TODAY (June 15, 2018, 8:49 AM), https://www.usato-
day.com/story/money/taxes/2018/06/15/overwithholding-tax-refunds-could-jump-26-next-year-re-
port/704515002/ (stating that roughly 75% of US workers make a habit of having too much of their pay 
withheld from their paychecks); see also Mitchell Hartman, Why Do People Overpay Their Taxes, Then 
Get Refunds?, MARKETPLACE (Apr. 13, 2015, 3:34 PM), https://www.market-
place.org/2015/04/13/economy/ive-always-wondered/why-do-people-overpay-their-taxes-then-get-re-
funds. 
 110. See Students and Employment, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, 
https://www.uscis.gov/working-united-states/students-and-exchange-visitors/students-and-employment 
(last visited Oct. 27, 2018) (the F1 Student Visa is a non-immigrant visa held by international students, 
which permits its holder to procure certain forms of employment). 
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Based on IRS and OCACT statistics, a substantial amount of tax paid by un-
documented immigrants is remitted through the employee withholding system.111 
In 2010, OCACT estimated that: 600,000 immigrant workers had temporary work 
authorized at some point in the past and had overstayed the term of their visas; 
700,000 unauthorized workers obtained fraudulent birth certificates at some point 
in the past, and these birth certificates allowed the workers to get a SSN; and 1.8 
million other immigrants worked and used a SSN that did not match their name.112 
However, as the paragraphs below indicate, the interplay between immigration and 
tax laws make this method of tax collection complicated for undocumented immi-
grants, and may have a negative impact on such persons’ ability to collect social 
security benefits or refunds of surplus taxes. 
C.   Signaling as an Important Normative Consideration for 
Tax Compliance 
An often-ignored motivation for compliance with tax laws is the signaling ef-
fect of such compliance. Undocumented immigrants who are questioned about why 
they pay taxes respond that they wish to be seen as law-abiding members of the 
community.113 In other words, these individuals believe that compliance with tax 
laws signals that they are “good” members of society, which helps them assimilate 
better within its structure.114 Compliance is therefore something connected to their 
reputation as law-abiding members of the society, as opposed to merely being pred-
icated by a desire to obey the law. 
Signaling behavior can emanate from taxpayers or from the government. When 
it emanates from the taxpayer, signaling is usually connected to their need to 
achieve a certain reputation within their society.115 On the other hand, when signal-
ing is considered in connection with government or quasi-government action, it re-
lates to actions by applicable institutions that encourage positive or negative tax 
compliance behavior on the part of the taxpayer.116 
Signaling is particularly important for undocumented immigrants who form 
part of the “underground economy,” a term of art used to describe persons who 
receive all payments for goods and services in cash to avoid certain legal and regu-
latory reporting requirements and taxation.117 Because individuals in the under-
ground economy have already taken affirmative steps to avoid regulation and taxa-
tion, the government would need to take additional steps to ensure that income 
earned by such individuals is actively brought into tax revenue.118 
In his article on tax compliance, Judge Richard Posner considers the character-
istics and effects of the signaling theory on tax compliance, noting that this could 
                                                          
 111. See Gee et al., supra note 36, at 4; Goss et al., supra note 34, at 3. 
 112. Goss et al., supra note 34, at 2, 4. 
 113. See Blanco, supra note 100. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See Posner, supra note 10, at 1806. 
 116. Id. at 1792. 
 117. See George L. Priest, The Ambiguous Moral Foundations of the Underground Economy, 103 
YALE L.J. 2259 (1994). 
 118. Id. at 2273 (arguing that underground economies serve a moral purpose of increasing economic 
opportunities for the poor and other victims of discrimination). 
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be a reason for tax compliance in the United States despite the small audit and pros-
ecution rates for tax offenses.119 In this regard, Posner defines social norms as “equi-
librium-signaling behavior,” arguing that tax compliance is a social norm used by 
members of society to signal that they are of a “good type” with whom association 
is desirable.120 He further suggests that the government should encourage such 
norms through certain signals that indicate its willingness to be fair to taxpayers, 
such as guaranteeing confidentiality of taxpayer information and providing proce-
dural safeguards for tax audits and litigation.121 In other words, taxpayers would be 
inclined to conform to social norms relating to tax compliance if it appears the gov-
ernment treats them equally across the board.122 This idea appears to explain the 
reputational character of tax compliance among undocumented immigrants and the 
high value placed on confidential tax reporting, to the extent that it enables them to 
continue this practice.123 
Undocumented immigrants arguably have a stronger incentive to signal com-
pliance with tax laws than other people, because they feel more pressure to seek 
acceptance within their immediate community.124 For this reason, undocumented 
immigrants who purchase a home, lease a commercial space, or buy personal prop-
erty that is easily observable by members of their community indirectly signal that 
they have complied with all applicable legal and regulatory requirements. To put it 
in a more picturesque form, the individual in question might as well be walking 
around saying to their neighbors, “Look, I pay my taxes. I am a law-abiding citizen. 
That is how I qualified for the loan that financed this home, etc.” Similarly, because 
receiving a tax refund signals that taxes have been paid, the fact that an undocu-
mented immigrant can discuss their refund with their neighbor indicates that they 
are conforming to the social norms of their society. 
Even where such positive signaling behavior is not warranted by the need to 
show commitment within their immediate community, the considerations discussed 
above, regarding tax compliance as an important factor for granting legal immigrant 
status or deferred action, are arguably signals by the government which invite com-
pliance with tax laws. Likewise, when banks and other commercial or quasi-gov-
ernment institutions only request evidence of tax compliance, and opt to forgo ad-
ditional inquiry into immigration status, those institutions send a signal. This mes-
sage tells people that irregularities in immigration status could be overlooked if the 
applicant pays their taxes.125 Further, as discussed in more detail below,126 the IRS 
provides similar signals by (1) keeping taxpayers’ identities confidential, even from 
                                                          
 119. See Posner, supra note 10, at 1783–84. 
 120. Id. at 1788–1800 (good types are associated with low discount rates; the willingness to sacrifice 
short term gains for long term benefits). 
 121. Id. at 1792–99. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Taxpayer Bill of Rights, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p5170.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 27, 2018) (in 2014, the IRS adopted the “Tax Payer Bill of Rights” culled from provi-
sions of the Code. Among other things, the Bill of Rights guarantees privacy, confidentiality and due 
process in audit proceedings). 
 124. See, e.g., Blanco, supra note 100. 
 125. See, e.g., U.S. BANK, supra note 101 (certain lenders may require a credit score, personal identi-
fying information and W-2 or I-9 tax forms as proof of employment or income and forego requesting for 
valid visas or immigration documents); Rohit Mittal, Personal Loans for Non-Citizens & Nonresidents 
in the USA, STILT, https://www.stilt.com/blog/2018/01/non-us-resident-loan/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2018). 
 126. See infra Part III.D. 
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immigration authorities, and (2) recognizing that refundable credits are not govern-
ment benefits, except where expressly indicated by law.127 
Negative government signals, such as refusing to grant any form of confiden-
tiality in tax reporting, could reduce compliance. In that case, just like the ideal legal 
world scenario discussed above, people like Sylvia and Aisha would be motivated 
to consume as many resources as possible and avoid any interaction with govern-
ment authorities, including the IRS, for fear of apprehension and removal. In other 
words, if undocumented immigrants feel that there are no real incentives for good 
behavior, they may consider it more beneficial to adopt behavioral patterns that 
maximize short term gains (including tax evasion) at a higher cost to society.128 
In the next sub-part, this article considers whether there is a connection be-
tween filing taxes and immigration enforcement, while keeping in mind the over-
arching discussion above regarding the effect of government signaling on tax com-
pliance. 
D.  Interagency Cooperation: Is there a Connection Between 
Filing Taxes and Immigration Enforcement? 
This part concludes the analysis of compliance issues and the significance of 
signaling. In the succeeding paragraphs, this article will examine the extent to which 
filings with the relevant federal tax enforcement agencies and communications be-
tween such agencies may result in immigration enforcement against undocumented 
immigrants. In other words, when an undocumented immigrant files their taxes, 
would this trigger closer immigration scrutiny? Accordingly, the disclosure obliga-
tions and limitations of the IRS, which administers federal income taxes, and the 
Social Security Administration (“SSA”), which administers FICA (payroll) taxes, 
will be examined in turn. 
i. Internal Revenue Service 
The IRS is under a legal obligation not to disclose identifying information re-
garding any taxpayer without his or her consent.129 In fact, to ensure an increase in 
undocumented taxpayer confidence, with respect to keeping personal information 
confidential, the IRS has issued the following guidance on taxes filed using non-
conforming SSNs: 
 
[I]f the individual has used someone else’s social security number to obtain 
employment, that SSN should be reflected on the Form W-2 the employer 
issues to that individual. So long as the individual uses his or her ITIN to 
properly report the wages that are reflected on the Form W-2 and pay the 
tax associated with that income, the individual has not violated the internal 
revenue laws.130 
                                                          
 127. See IRS Presentation, supra note 98, at 3–4, 45. 
 128. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 10, at 1786 (regarding Posner’s analysis of the “prisoner’s dilemma”). 
 129. 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (2018). 
 130. Memorandum from Susan L. Hartford, Tech. Advisor to the Special Counsel, I.R.S. to Nina E. 
Olson, Nat’l Taxpayer Advoc. 2 (June 21, 2010), https://www.irs.gov/pub/lanoa/pmta_2010-21.pdf 
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This is consistent with past IRS confidentiality practices that have indicated the 
IRS will not prosecute anyone who reports illegally earned income on their tax re-
turns, although they may still face criminal liability under other laws.131 It also lends 
credence to the IRS’s understanding, although not formally stated, that signaling is 
a strong factor in ensuring tax compliance, particularly on the part of undocumented 
immigrants.132 
There are some exceptions to the rule regarding taxpayer confidentiality. The 
most notable exception is the IRS’s obligation to disclose tax return information to 
“law enforcement agencies who are investigate[ng] and prosecute[ng] non-tax crim-
inal laws.”133 This means that while undocumented immigrant taxpayers would not 
ordinarily attract immigration scrutiny by merely filing their tax returns, infor-
mation filed with the IRS by undocumented immigrants who have committed a non-
tax related criminal offense may still be discovered by immigration authorities.134 
Another important exception to IRS confidentiality rules is that the IRS may 
disclose information relating to payroll taxes and income taxes to the SSA.135 How-
ever, as discussed below, employees of the SSA who receive this information are 
required to keep it confidential in the same way that the IRS would.136 
It seems as though the IRS has adopted the correct stance with respect to en-
suring undocumented taxpayer compliance through positive signaling. However, 
whether this stance will continue under the present regime, given the current push 
for stronger immigration enforcement in all federal agencies, is unclear.137 
ii. Social Security Administration 
The SSA does not have the same confidentiality obligations as the IRS with 
respect to information in its custody. In fact, under the INA, the SSA is required to 
disclose the identity and location of aliens to the Department of Homeland Security 
(“DHS”) and the United States Citizen and Immigrations Services (“USCIS”).138 
However, different restrictions apply depending on whether the information is clas-
sified as tax or non-tax information.139 Non-tax information may be disclosed upon 
                                                          
(however, the same guidance notes that an individual who provides the employer with false identification 
documents to obtain employment has violated 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(1) (2006)). 
 131. See, e.g., TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 521.051(a) (2009); 18 U.S.C. § 1028. 
 132. See IRS Presentation, supra note 98, at 20. 
 133. I.R.C. § 6103(i)(1) (2018); see also Disclosure Laws, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
https://www.irs.gov/government-entities/federal-state-local-governments/disclosure-laws [hereinafter 
Disclosure Laws] (last updated Nov. 29, 2018) (summarizing applicable IRS disclosure laws). 
 134. § 6103(i)(1); see also Disclosure Laws, supra note 133. 
 135. § 6103(l)(1) (providing that return information related to taxes imposed under Chapters 2, 21, and 
24 may be disclosed to the SSA as needed to carry out its responsibilities under the Social Security Act. 
Chapter 2 relates to self-employment income and does not normally concern employers. Chapter 21 
concerns social security and Medicare (FICA) tax. Chapter 24 deals with income tax withholding). 
 136. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN., PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL SYSTEM, GN 03313.095, 
DISCLOSURE TO THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (DHS) (Dec. 2, 2016), http://pol-
icy.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0203313095 [hereinafter POMS]. 
 137. Amanda Sakuma, Donald Trump’s Plan to Outsource Immigration Enforcement to Local Cops, 
ATLANTIC (Feb. 18, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/trump-immigration-
enforcement/517071/. 
 138. 8 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (1996). 
 139. POMS, supra note 136. 
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a written request from DHS or USCIS.140 Tax information,141 on the other hand, is 
more restricted and may only be disclosed if the taxpayer in question earned income 
on a non-work SSN.142 In that case, the SSA may disclose the reported earnings, the 
name, and the address of the taxpayer and the person who reported the earnings.143 
These disclosure requirements are presumably aimed at addressing the issue of so-
cial security misuse. It is not clear whether the SSA will voluntarily disclose infor-
mation on returns based on falsified or non-matching SSNs issued for work pur-
poses,144 although it would seem that this information may be procured upon request 
by the Attorney General of the United States.145 
In view of the foregoing, it appears that disclosing a taxpayer’s immigration 
information is more likely to occur under the SSA rather than the IRS, which means 
that undocumented immigrants subject to employer withholdings are more likely 
than others to face immigration scrutiny on account of FICA tax filings. Neverthe-
less, it is difficult to say with confidence that the likelihood of exposure will sub-
stantially reduce the possibility that these individuals will pay taxes or file annual 
returns, particularly when such taxes are withheld at source. In any case, a taxpayer 
whose FICA taxes are withheld at source may consider it advantageous at that point 
to file an annual return in order to benefit from any available refundable tax credit. 
All things considered, the above discussion supports the proposition that, in circum-
stances where taxpayer autonomy is an integral part of tax compliance, positive 
signaling by the government that discourages immigration enforcement solely on 
account of tax reporting goes a long way in securing an undocumented taxpayer’s 
compliance. 
The next part of this article discusses the extent to which undocumented immi-
grants receive benefits under applicable laws, with an emphasis on social security, 
Medicare, Medicaid, and refundable tax credits, respectively. This article also dis-
cusses the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996 (“PRWORA”).146 An examination of Medicare and Medicaid benefits will il-
lustrate how this law substantially circumscribes undocumented immigrants’ access 
to benefits under various laws. 
                                                          
 140. Id. (non-tax information is defined as information on the social security card or application, such 
as social security numbers, date of birth, place of birth, or address information. A request for such infor-
mation must be written and must state that the individual about whom the information is sought is an 
alien. If DHS or USCIS does not state that the subject individual is an alien, the identity and location 
information, and if it is located in SSA records, it may be disclosed if SSA records indicate the individual 
was an alien when he/she last received a social security card). 
 141. Id. (information such as names and addresses included in wage reports submitted to SSA by em-
ployers and self-employed individuals are considered tax return information and are restricted from dis-
closure unless the taxpayer in question has made earnings under a social security number that was not 
issued for work). 
 142. 8 U.S.C. § 1360(c). 
 143. Id. (pre-1997 earnings may only be disclosed with the consent of the IRS and at the discretion of 
the SSA. However, the SSA is required to provide annual returns of post-1997 earnings to the DHS and 
USCIS). 
 144. Id. § 1360(b) (the extent of disclosure is governed by the Privacy Act routine use exception). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–193, 
110 Stat. 2105. 
19
Obiokoye: Taxation of Undocumented Immigrants: The Uneasy Connection Betwee
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
378 B.E.T.R. [Vol. 2 2018 
IV. RECEIVING THE BENEFITS OF TAXATION 
As noted earlier, income tax and payroll tax revenues are usually allocated, at 
least in part, to the socioeconomic functions of government. Social security, Medi-
care, and Medicaid are some of the benefits that are directly derived from taxa-
tion.147 Refundable credits are another class of quasi-benefits that qualifying tax-
payers may claim, particularly in instances where the credits have a welfare purpose 
and could potentially result in zero or negative tax liability.148 However, as this ar-
ticle will show below, most of these benefits are outside the reach of the undocu-
mented immigrant because they are usually tied to legal immigration status, work 
authorization, or both. 
A. Social Security 
The current social security system benefits people who have already retired, 
people who are disabled, survivors of workers who have died, and dependents of 
beneficiaries.149 Social security benefits are generally funded from the revenue de-
rived from payroll taxes, which are deposited into applicable trust funds150 and paid 
out to eligible individuals. To establish eligibility, a taxpayer must submit certain 
qualifying documents, including proof of United States citizenship or lawful immi-
gration status and a SSN.151 
Because most undocumented immigrants will have neither a SSN nor a docu-
ment evidencing lawful immigration status, they will be excluded from claiming 
these benefits even though they may have contributed towards them. While current 
taxpayers do not immediately receive benefits, unless they are disabled or are sur-
vivors of deceased workers,152 payments towards social security are credited to each 
person’s earnings record by the SSA for the purpose of establishing eligibility and 
determining the amount of benefits to which they are entitled.153 This means that 
earnings by undocumented immigrants which are not properly allocated to their 
earnings records will not count towards their eligibility for benefits. 
Notwithstanding, certain classes of undocumented immigrants may still be el-
igible for benefits, such as: “[(1)] individuals who began receiving benefits before 
1997 and never obtained authorization to work; [(2)] individuals who never ob-
tained authorization to work, received a SSN before 2004, and now live abroad; 
                                                          
 147. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN., UNDERSTANDING THE BENEFITS (2018), 
https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10024.pdf [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING THE BENEFITS]. 
 148. Such as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). See I.R.C. § 32 (2018). 
 149. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN., RETIREMENT BENEFITS (2018), https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-
10035.pdf. 
 150. Such as the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (“OASI”) and the Disability Insurance (“DI”) Trust 
Funds. See Old-Age & Survivors Insurance Trust Fund, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN., 
https://www.ssa.gov/oact/progdata/describeoasi.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2018); Disability Insurance 
Trust Fund, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/oact/progdata/describedi.html (last visited 
Oct. 28, 2018). 
 151. UNDERSTANDING THE BENEFITS, supra note 147, at 5. 
 152. And even then, eligibility for benefits may be restricted by the tax payer’s own eligibility, or that 
of a deceased spouse or parent. See Michael Doran, Intergenerational Equity in Fiscal Policy Reform, 
61 TAX L. REV. 241, 246 (2008). 
 153. UNDERSTANDING THE BENEFITS, supra note 147, at 2–3. 
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[(3)] individuals who currently have authorization to work but did not have author-
ization while previously residing within the United States”; [(4)] those who received 
a SSN on account of a non-immigrant visa which has now expired; and [(5)] those 
who “obtained a SSN through illegitimate means.”154 In each of these cases, how-
ever, the requirement to document ownership of reported taxable earnings is still a 
high hurdle, and meeting this requirement seems to be the exception and not the 
rule. 
As indicated above, approximately “3.1 million undocumented immigrants [re-
mitted payroll] taxes in 2010.”155 However, a large percentage of this number was 
unable to receive the benefits of the earnings, because (1) claiming such earnings 
might have triggered immigration scrutiny,156 (2) the relevant earnings may have 
been credited to someone else’s record,157 or (3) they may have been credited to the 
Earnings Suspense File (where the name and SSN do not match).158 Unclaimed in-
come that is credited to the Earning Suspense File will be recycled into the general 
social security revenue and allocated to the applicable socioeconomic infrastruc-
ture.159 
Since suspended wages can affect a person’s eligibility for—and the amount 
of—social security benefits, a substantial number of undocumented immigrants 
who pay social security taxes will receive little or no social security benefits in re-
turn.160 For instance, if Aisha or her husband Philip apply for a job, they will likely 
be asked to provide SSNs for employment authorization verification. Since they 
will not have valid SSNs, Aisha and Philip may resort to providing an ITIN or fal-
sified, stolen, or borrowed SSNs. In any of these scenarios, none of Aisha or Philip’s 
FICA contributions will count towards their respective earnings record. Rather, 
such contributions will be moved to the Earnings Suspense File and will be treated 
as regular government revenue if left unclaimed. Considering that, as of 2016, at 
least “two-thirds of undocumented immigrants” have been in the United States for 
more than a decade, these numbers begin to add up considerably.161 
                                                          
 154. Goss et al., supra note 34, at 2–3. 
 155. Id. at 3. 
 156. See supra Part III. 
 157. This might occur when the social security number and the name submitted to the employer match 
the Social Security Administration’s records of that particular individual, but they are not a match to the 
undocumented immigrant that submits that information to their employer. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR 
GEN. OF THE SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN., Report No. A-03-15-50058, STATUS OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY 
ADMINISTRATION’S EARNINGS SUSPENSE FILE (2015), http://oig.ssa.gov/sites/default/files/au-
dit/full/pdf/A-03-15-50058.pdf. 
 158. Id. (this Report discloses that the “SSA posted to the ESF about 37 million (95[%]) W-2s repre-
senting $351 billion in wages for [tax years] 2008 to 2012 because the name and SSN combinations did 
not match SSA’s records.” Three percent of the W-2s were suspended because SSA’s records showed 
number holders disclaimed the wages, were deceased, or were minor children. “The remaining [two] 
percent of suspended W-2s included invalid SSNs that resembled an [ITIN] issued by the” IRS. The 
Report also notes that a name and SSN mismatch “can occur for such reasons as the (1) wage earners 
changed their names and did not notify SSA; (2) employers reported the name and social security number 
incorrectly; or (3) individuals deliberately used a social security number that did not belong to them.” 
An individual may disclaim wages where such individual fraudulently used someone else’s documents 
and obtained a social security number with that person’s number). 
 159. Martin H. Bosworth, The Earnings Suspense File: Social Security’s “Secret Stash”, CONSUMER 
AFFAIRS, https://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2006/02/ss_secret_stash.html (last visited Oct. 28, 
2018). 
 160. Goss et al., supra note 34, at 5. 
 161. The Truth about America’s Illegal Immigrants, WEEK (Sept. 24, 2016), http://theweek.com/arti-
cles/650402/truth-about-americas-illegal-immigrants. 
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B. Medicare and Medicaid 
As mentioned briefly in the foregoing parts, federal taxes are used to fund Med-
icare and Medicaid—initiatives that target poor persons, disabled persons, and per-
sons who have reached retirement age.162 Unfortunately, much like other benefits 
discussed in this article, undocumented immigrants are ineligible for Medicare, 
Medicaid, and even food stamps.163 
i.   The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Rec-
onciliation Act 
The PRWORA is the foundational statute under which Medicare and Medicaid 
benefits are denied to undocumented immigrants.164 Among other things, the 
PRWORA expressly provides that any alien who is not a “qualified alien”165 “is not 
eligible for any federal public benefit.”166 A similar restriction is placed on eligibil-
ity for state and local public benefits under any state statute.167 As one would expect, 
undocumented aliens are not included in the definition of qualified aliens.168 
State and local “public benefits” are defined as follows: 
(A) any grant, contract, loan, professional license, or commercial license 
provided by an agency of a State or local government or by appropriated 
funds of a State or local government; and 
(B) any retirement, welfare, health, disability, public or assisted housing, 
postsecondary education, food assistance, unemployment benefit, or any 
                                                          
 162. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v) (2018). 
 163. Id. In addition to restricting Medicaid access to certain classes of immigrants, this statute condi-
tions state eligibility for Medicaid funding on the restriction of access to Medicaid to individuals who 
lawfully reside in the United States. Note that the subsequent expansion of Medicaid under the Afford-
able Care Act continues to be subject to this restriction pertaining to undocumented aliens. Several states 
including New York, Indiana, and Illinois have adopted statutes which do not permit undocumented 
immigrants to obtain healthcare under Medicaid, except in emergency situations. See Greenery Rehab. 
Grp., Inc. v. Sabol, 841 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. N.Y. 1993). 
 164. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–193, 
110 Stat. 2105. See Elizabeth R. Chesler, Denying Undocumented Immigrants Access to Medicaid: A 
Denial of Their Equal Protection Rights?, 17 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 255, 259 (2008). 
 165. See 8 U.S.C. § 1641 (2008). 
 166. 8 U.S.C. § 1611 (1998) (maintaining certain exceptions for enumerated emergency benefits). 
 167. 8 U.S.C. § 1621 (1998). 
 168. See 8 U.S.C. § 1641 (defining “qualified alien” as 
[A]n alien who, at the time the alien applies for, receives, or attempts to receive a Federal public benefit, 
is– 
(1) an alien who is lawfully admitted for permanent residence under the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act, 
(2) an alien who is granted asylum under section 208 of such Act, 
(3) a refugee who is admitted to the United States under section 207 of such Act, 
(4) an alien who is paroled into the United States under section 212(d)(5) of such Act for a period 
of at least 1 year, 
(5) an alien whose deportation is being withheld under section 243(h) of such Act, 
(6) an alien who is granted conditional entry pursuant to section 203(a)(7) of such Act, or 
(7) an alien who is a Cuban and Haitian entrant (as defined in section 501(e) of the Refugee Edu-
cation Assistance Act of 1980)). 
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other similar benefit for which payments or assistance are provided to an 
individual, household, or family eligibility unit by an agency of a State or 
local government or by appropriated funds of a State or local govern-
ment.169 
“Federal public benefits” include the following: 
(A) any grant, contract, loan, professional license, or commercial license 
provided by an agency of the United States or by appropriated funds of the 
United States; and 
(B) any retirement, welfare, health, disability, public or assisted housing, 
post secondary education, food assistance, unemployment benefit, or any 
other similar benefit for which payments or assistance are provided to an 
individual, household, or family eligibility unit by an agency of the United 
States or by appropriated funds of the United States.170 
In addition to Medicare and Medicaid, the PRWORA also prevents undocu-
mented immigrants from claiming other forms of federal aid, such as food 
stamps,171 Supplemental Security Income, and Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families.172 Finally, the PRWORA requires states that receive federal grants for 
certain social services to provide “names, addresses, and other identifying details 
of [undocumented immigrants to the] Immigration and Naturalization Service.”173 
A similar obligation is imposed on public housing agencies that provide aid under 
federal housing programs.174 These provisions make it unlikely that undocumented 
immigrants will seek federal or state welfare benefits, even when they are not ex-
pressly excluded. However, as discussed next, refundable tax credits are treated 
somewhat differently from the other benefits discussed so far. 
C. Refundable Tax Credits 
Generally, refundable tax credits are not considered to be federal benefits.175 
This means that except where expressly prohibited by law, the IRS will offer tax 
credits to all eligible persons regardless of their immigrant status.176 The IRS has 
                                                          
 169. 8 U.S.C. § 1621. 
 170. 8 U.S.C. § 1611. 
 171. 8 U.S.C. § 1621. Though it may be available to minor children. See 8 U.S.C. § 1641; see also 
Gabrielle Lessard, Reflections on the 20th Anniversary of the Personal Responsibility and Work Oppor-
tunity Reconciliation Act, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR. (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.nilc.org/news/the-
torch/8-22-16/. 
 172. 8 U.S.C. § 1611(c); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1612 (2008). 
 173. 42 U.S.C. § 611(a) (1996). 
 174. 42 U.S.C. § 1437y (1997). 
 175. See IRS Presentation, supra note 98, at 7; see also ABILITY OF UNAUTHORIZED ALIENS, supra 
note 5, at 8. 
 176. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 37 (2008); I.R.C. § 6401 (2017); Brooks Jackson, Tax Credits for Illegal Immi-
grants, FACTCHECK.ORG (May 11, 2012), https://www.factcheck.org/2012/05/tax-credits-for-illegal-
immigrants/. 
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repeatedly affirmed its stance on granting access to refundable credits to undocu-
mented immigrants, noting that:177 (1) the purpose of refundable credits is to assist 
poor, working families who pay taxes, and denying them these credits would de-
prive them access to support; and (2) within families where parents or heads of 
household are undocumented immigrants, there may be up to 4 million children 
who are United States citizens by birth who would be denied rightful benefits if the 
credits were declined.178 As such, undocumented immigrants are not generally re-
stricted from claiming refundable tax credits. 
However, the PRWORA amended the Code to provide that the EITC—a re-
fundable tax credit that could be used to offset tax obligations and which includes 
a positive payment component regardless of tax liability—is not available to per-
sons who do not possess a SSN.179 While the EITC has been widely praised as a 
success story in welfare reform, undocumented immigrants will not enjoy this ben-
efit.180 For similar reasons, undocumented immigrants were unable to claim the 
2008 Economic Stimulus Tax credit181 and the Making Work Pay credit.182 
A notable tax credit that would be available to undocumented immigrants is the 
Additional Child Tax Credit (“ACTC”), which is the refundable portion of the Child 
Tax Credit available to families with children below age 17.183 However, there has 
been a strong push to prevent undocumented immigrants from claiming the 
ACTC.184 “In a letter to President Trump dated February 11, 2017, [U.S.] Repre-
sentative Luke Messer, R-Ind., asked Trump to issue an executive order directing 
the Treasury Department to prohibit the [IRS] from allowing individuals to file for 
the Child Tax Credit or the [ACTC] without an” SSN.185 “Most Americans are 
astonished to learn that each year billions of taxpayer dollars are given out to people 
who are in our country illegally,” Messer said in a written statement.186 Messer also 
introduced legislation H.R.363 that, if passed, would require those individuals ap-
plying for child tax credit deductions to include in their tax returns a valid SSN for 
the parent, as well as their children.187 
The high number of ACTC claims by undocumented immigrants could be ex-
plained by the fact that undocumented immigrants tend to be younger than the U.S. 
population overall and are more likely to be in the child-bearing and child-rearing 
                                                          
 177. See, e.g., IRS Presentation, supra note 98. 
 178. See id. at 9. 
 179. See I.R.C. § 32 (c)(1)(D), (m) (2018) (including for spouses and children who do not possess social 
security numbers). 
 180. For a more comprehensive analysis of the EITC, see Ann L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax 
Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533 (1995). 
 181. I.R.C. § 6428(e)(3)(A) (repealed 2014). 
 182. I.R.C. § 36A(d)(l)(A)(i) (repealed 2014). 
 183. Id. 
 184. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., No. 2011-41-061, INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE 
NOT AUTHORIZED TO WORK IN THE UNITED STATES WERE PAID $4.2 BILLION IN REFUNDABLE 
CREDITS (2011), https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2011reports/201141061fr.pdf [hereinafter 
TIGTA REPORT]. 
 185. Dean DeChiaro, Messer Asks Trump to Block Tax Loophole for Illegal Immigrants, CQ ROLL 
CALL, Feb. 14, 2017, 2017 CQIMMRPT 0088; see also Press Release, U.S. Congressman Luke Messer, 
Rep. Messer Pushes to Eliminate Tax Credits for Illegal Immigrants: Says Proposal Should be Part of 
Tax Cut Package (Oct. 4, 2017), https://messer.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?Documen-
tID=647. 
 186. DeChiaro, supra note 185. 
 187. Child Tax Credit Integrity Preservation Act of 2017, H.R. 363, 115th Cong (2017). 
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years; nearly half (about 46%) of unauthorized adults are parents of minor chil-
dren.188 More importantly, if one considers that a significant portion of the house-
holds headed by unauthorized aliens may have United States citizen children, as 
well as spouses who may be legal permanent residents, then the validity of the con-
cerns underlying the push to eliminate this credit for undocumented immigrants be-
gins to be called into question.189 
In 2010, the Pew Hispanic Center estimated that “at least 9 million people 
[were] in ‘mixed-status’ families that included at least one unauthorized adult alien 
and at least one U.S.-born child.”190 “Along with the approximately 1 million un-
authorized [aliens] who are [minor] children,” Pew researchers estimated that 4.5 
million minor children have been born in the United States to a family in which at 
least one parent was an unauthorized alien.191 Further, data collected in 2013 by the 
Census Bureau’s American Community Survey showed that a total of 5.1 million 
U.S.-born children were living with an undocumented parent.192 Applying this to 
the hypothetical example using Aisha’s household, if one considers that Michael 
and Mardea are both United States citizens in a family headed by undocumented 
parents, Aisha and Philip, equity and fairness considerations begin once again to 
come into play. In other words, is it fair or equitable to take away benefits from 
undocumented immigrants when such denial would ultimately mean deprivation to 
American citizens? 
A recent amendment to the Code appears to have addressed this problem by 
requiring the ACTC be claimed only with respect to children who have SSNs.193 As 
of yet, there is no indication that the parents of such children would also need to 
furnish their own SSNs in order to claim the credit.194 As noted above, the push 
continues towards preventing undocumented parents from claiming such credits, 
even where their children would otherwise qualify.195 
In any case, a sizeable number of undocumented immigrants will be unable to 
claim any tax credits or refunds on excess taxes withheld, because they either did 
not have a valid SSN at the time of withholding and the statute of limitations passed, 
or because they lack the necessary documents required to obtain an ITIN before the 
end of the limitations period.196 Other undocumented taxpayers will forgo filing tax 
returns to claim refunds, because they fear deportation, particularly when such tax-
payers obtain employment using false or borrowed SSNs, or SSNs issued under 
                                                          
 188. Paul Taylor et al., Unauthorized Immigrants: Length of Residency, Patterns of Parenthood, PEW 
RES. CTR. (Dec. 1, 2011), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2011/12/01/unauthorized-immigrants-length-of-
residency-patterns-of-parenthood/. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Robert Warren, US-Born Children of Undocumented Residents: Numbers and Characteristics In 
2013, CTR. FOR MIGRATION STUD. (Sept. 28, 2015), http://cmsny.org/publications/warren-usbornchil-
dren/. 
 193. Budget Fiscal Year, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11022, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017). 
 194. I.R.C. § 24(h)(7) (2018). 
 195. See, e.g., Taylor et al., supra note 188; Warren, supra note 192. 
 196. See infra Part VI for a discussion on the ITIN and social security number as forms of tax identifi-
cation. See also DEBRA HOLLAND, TAXPAYER ADVOC. SERV., INDIVIDUAL TAXPAYER IDENTIFICATION 
NUMBERS: ITIN APPLICATION PROCEDURES BURDEN TAXPAYERS AND CREATE A BARRIER TO RETURN 
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expired visas or work authorizations.197 These taxpayers will consequently pay 
more taxes than what they owe, and, if no return is filed to claim an outstanding 
refund within three years, the money becomes the property of the United States 
Treasury.198 
Because undocumented immigrants are usually in the lower income brack-
ets,199 their inability to claim applicable tax credits and refunds results in a higher 
effective rate of tax on such immigrants than that imposed on other members of the 
society. This higher tax rate is sometimes referred to as the “Undocumented Immi-
grant Tax.”200 The next part of this article briefly considers efficiency and fairness 
issues raised by the Undocumented Immigrant Tax, as well as its effect on compli-
ance. 
V.   BENEFITS VS. BURDENS: EFFICIENCY AND FAIRNESS 
CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANT TAX 
The Undocumented Immigrant Tax is an undesirable tax for efficiency, equity, 
and fairness reasons. A tax system is inefficient if it causes people to change their 
behavior in order to avoid taxation, without any corresponding benefit to the gov-
ernment.201 In other words, the efficiency of a tax system is directly related to the 
amount of deadweight loss that it causes.202 The United States’ current tax system 
may appear to be efficient if undocumented immigrants’ willingness to pay taxes is 
thought of as inelastic,203 notwithstanding the extent of their tax burden. However, 
this may not always be the case, as elasticity within groups is often tied to the extent 
of their understanding and perceived sense of fairness of the tax system.204 
                                                          
 197. See Sean Severe, Here’s What’ll Happen to the Economy if We Deport Undocumented Immi-
grants, FORTUNE (Sept. 8, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/09/08/trump-undocumented-immigrants-
daca/; I.R.C. § 7201 (1982) (providing that the penalty for tax evasion is a fine of “not more than 
$100,000 ($500,000 in the case of a corporation), or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both, 
together with the costs of prosecution.”). 
 198. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DOES THE IRS HAVE MONEY WAITING FOR YOU?, 
https://www.irs.gov/uac/does-the-irs-have-money-waiting-for-you (last updated Aug. 28, 2011). 
 199. See Immigrants in the United States: A Profile of America’s Foreign-Born Population, CTR. FOR 
IMMIGR. STUD., https://cis.org/Immigrants-United-States-Profile-Americas-ForeignBorn-Population-0 
(last visited Oct. 4, 2018). 
 200. Lipman, supra note 52, at 96 (suggesting that undocumented immigrants’ inability to claim social 
security and Medicare benefits while paying regressive payroll taxes, is another aspect of the Undocu-
mented Immigrant Tax). 
 201. See MALMAN ET AL., supra note 17, at 9. This result is known as a “deadweight loss.” See 
Deadweight Loss, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/deadweightloss.asp (last vis-
ited Oct. 29, 2018) [hereinafter Deadweight Loss]. 
 202. See Deadweight Loss, supra note 201. 
 203. MALMAN ET AL., supra note 17, at 9 (elasticity in relation to tax compliance means a taxpayer’s 
ability to change his/her behavior in response to changes in taxes. The idea is that people may substitute 
a certain activity for something else as the costs of that activity increases. If an activity is highly elastic, 
a change in the cost of the activity will result in larger substitutions. On the other hand, if an activity is 
rather inelastic, a change in the cost of the activity will result in small substitutions or no substitutions 
of that activity. Thus, a taxpayer is inelastic if he or she does not change his/her behavior despite changes 
in taxes or tax laws). See Yergensen, supra note 104, at 581–82. 
 204. MALMAN ET AL., supra note 17, at 9. 
26
The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review, Vol. 2 [2018], Iss. 2, Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/betr/vol2/iss2/7
Iss. 2] Obiokoye: Taxation of Undocumented Immigrants 385 
Horizontal equity in tax policy means treating equally situated persons the 
same.205 Vertical equity, on the other hand, exists when tax laws differentiate ap-
propriately among unequals, conventionally thought to require people with greater 
utility or income to bear greater net tax burdens.206 A tax system is usually consid-
ered to be fair when horizontal and vertical equity are reflected in existing law, 
although this test is often subjective in nature.207 This means that taxpayers will 
likely consider a law to be unfair where they believe that they are treated differently 
from other equally situated people. The Undocumented Immigrant Tax embodies 
such unfairness, as it results in certain people bearing a higher tax burden than other 
similarly situated persons.208 Indeed, considering that undocumented immigrants 
are more likely to fall within the lowest income brackets, issues of unfairness be-
come even more pronounced.209 When the least well-off members of society end up 
paying the highest taxes, this embodies the much-cited paradox in George Orwell’s 
Animal Farm that “some animals are more equal than others.”210 
A tax system that imposes equal taxes on similarly situated persons—but does 
not provide equal benefits for the same classes of people—could cause those denied 
access to benefits to change their behavior in response to a perceived sense of “un-
fairness.” If one imagines a scenario where all undocumented immigrants were 
made aware of the actual audit rate, as well as the statistical probability of criminal 
prosecution for tax evasion, it is possible that more undocumented immigrants 
would change their behavior in favor of noncompliance. This response would lead 
to deadweight loss. 
Further, because signaling is an important aspect of compliance, unequal treat-
ment of undocumented immigrants compared to similarly situated taxpayers indi-
cates unfairness. This would be a negative signal which would disincentivize un-
documented immigrants from compliance by reinforcing a sense of inequality and 
uncertainty regarding their position in the society.211 
Finally, the Undocumented Immigrant Tax fails to consider that some undocu-
mented immigrant families include members who are U.S. citizens,212 and so deny-
ing benefits to undocumented immigrant families would, in some cases, deny ben-
efits to United States citizens. For instance, as mentioned above, Mardea and Mi-
chael are hypothetical United States citizens who are dependents of undocumented 
immigrants. This means that any benefit denied to Aisha and Philip, including any 
difficulty in procuring employment and the absence of a clear path towards legali-
zation, would also impact their United States citizen children. Accordingly, the Un-
documented Immigrant Tax is, in some cases, a tax on both undocumented immi-
grants and United States citizens. Again, this raises issues of fairness, because cer-
tain United States citizens are treated differently from others in similar economic 
positions. 
                                                          
 205. Boris I. Bittker, Equity, Efficiency, and Income Tax Theory: Do Misallocations Drive Out Inequi-
ties?, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735 (1979). 
 206. Id. at 735–36. 
 207. Id. at 735. 
 208. See Lipman, supra note 52, at 96; see also Luis Larrea, Taxation Inequality and Undocumented 
Immigrants, 5 WM MITCHELL L. RAZA J. 2, 18 (2013). 
 209. See Lipman, supra note 52, at 99. 
 210. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 112 (1945). 
 211. See generally Posner, supra note 10, at 1819. 
 212. This includes children born to these individuals in the United States. See ABILITY OF 
UNAUTHORIZED ALIENS, supra note 5, at 5. 
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In view of the above, changes to current eligibility requirements for benefits213 
are warranted to eliminate all or part of the Undocumented Immigrant Tax. With 
this in mind, the next part of this article focuses on the connection between the 
taxation of undocumented immigrants and illegal activity. In other words, are tax 
and immigration laws compelling these immigrants to engage in illegal activity? 
VI. TAXATION, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT, AND ILLEGAL 
ACTIVITY: A TENUOUS CONNECTION 
In this part, this article examines the connection between the requirements of 
tax and immigration laws and illegal activity. Particularly, this part focuses on the 
negative effects and general legal compliance challenges that arise when ITINs and 
SSNs are used to restrict government benefits and keep employment out of the reach 
of undocumented immigrants. 
A.  Problems with Establishing Legal Identity for Tax Pur-
poses 
This section provides an overview of the ITIN and SSN as instruments for es-
tablishing legal identity for tax and employment purposes. Building on that foun-
dation, the difficulties that undocumented aliens face in order to procure an ITIN or 
SSN will then be considered, along with the possibility that such difficulties will 
cause undocumented persons to resort to illegal activity as a matter of necessity. 
i. The Individual Tax Identification Number 
The ITIN is a nine-digit number assigned for the purposes of federal income 
tax administration.214 The ITIN cannot be used after obtaining a SSN, and it does 
not confer immigration status or work authorization.215 Before 1996, SSNs were 
assigned to taxpayers for administrative purposes—regardless of authorization to 
work—and temporary ITINs were assigned to taxpayers awaiting the issuance of a 
SSN.216 After 1996, as part of the move to restrict unauthorized immigrants from 
accessing federal benefits, the SSA stopped issuing SSNs to immigrants without 
work authorization.217 Immigrants who do not qualify for SSNs are now issued per-
manent ITINs for tax administrative purposes.218 
In view of the foregoing, the ITIN is the most frequent form of legal identifi-
cation used by undocumented immigrants for tax remittance.219 However, ITIN pro-
                                                          
 213. This is particularly true concerning benefits administered through the Code, which are arguably 
more directly connected to taxation. See Francine J. Lipman, The Taxation of Undocumented Immi-
grants: Separate, Unequal, and Without Representation, 9 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 6 (2006). 
 214. Id. at 22. See Individual Taxpayer Identification Number, INTERNAL REVENUE SER., 
https://www.irs.gov/individuals/individual-taxpayer-identification-number (last updated Oct. 3, 2018). 
 215. See ABILITY OF UNAUTHORIZED ALIENS, supra note 5, at 1. 
 216. Id. at 8. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
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curement is not particularly easy, especially for individuals who do not have com-
plete foreign status documentation.220 ITINs are difficult to procure for the follow-
ing reasons: 
(a) long wait times for ITIN processing with an increased number being 
rejected or suspended due to IRS work force capacity limitations; (b) re-
quirements that ITIN filers submit a physical copy of their tax return to-
gether with the ITIN application to prove that the taxpayer has a valid fil-
ing requirement; and (c) the requirement that ITIN applicants provide orig-
inal immigration documents or proof of foreign citizenship to support ap-
plications.221 
These onerous requirements result in undocumented taxpayers forgoing the fil-
ing of a joint return, claiming exemptions, or filing with an incorrect filing status 
because their spouses and dependents cannot obtain ITINs before the return filing 
date.222 Some undocumented taxpayers may forgo filing taxes altogether because of 
the difficulty of obtaining an ITIN, particularly since a number of these individuals 
will face undue hardship from not having their original documents for an extended 
period.223 Not having original documents could subject such immigrants to the risk 
of fines and incarceration in some locations,224 and they also face the costs of ob-
taining duplicates if lost.225 
The underground economy serves many undocumented immigrants who are 
unable to secure regular employment and who prefer cash payments to avoid the 
reporting issues described above and apprehension by immigration authorities.226 
Note, however, that individuals who avoid direct taxation through the underground 
economy do not necessarily avoid taxation altogether, as they are still taxed on their 
consumption through sales tax and other indirect taxes. Furthermore, as noted ear-
lier, some undocumented immigrants working in the underground economy may, 
due to their need to signal within their immediate community, subsequently file tax 
returns and remit outstanding taxes once they obtain documentation allowing them 
to do so.227 
                                                          
 220. For example, immigrants who enter the U.S. surreptitiously, without visas or permission. Lipman, 
supra note 52, at 101. 
 221. Id. at 121. 
 222. See id. at 119–32. 
 223. Id. at 121 (the filing process can cause these immigrants to be without their identification docu-
ments for extended periods of time, often for many months). 
 224. See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 411–15 (2012) (striking down a preliminary injunction 
against an Arizona statute which required state officers to make a “reasonable attempt . . . to determine 
the immigration status of any person they stop, detain, or arrest on some other legitimate basis if reason-
able suspicion exists that the person is an alien and is unlawfully present in the United States” and to 
detain any person who is arrested until their immigration status is determined) (internal quotations omit-
ted). 
 225. This is an observation based on the author’s personal interviews with persons who wish to remain 
confidential. See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., REVISED APPLICATION STANDARDS FOR ITINS 
(2018), https://www.irs.gov/individuals/revised-application-standards-for-itins (for the purposes of 
proving identity and foreign status in order to obtain an ITIN, the Internal Revenue Service will accept 
only 13 types of documents, each with disparate costs of replacement). 
 226. See Priest, supra note 117, at 2282–83; see also Campbell, supra note 58. 
 227. See supra Part III.C (discussing signaling as an important aspect of tax compliance). 
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ii. The Social Security Number 
Generally, a SSN is assigned only to citizens of the United States, Legal Per-
manent Residents, and other persons who have authorization to work under a valid 
non-immigrant visa or other legally protected status.228 In very limited cases, a SSN 
may be issued for non-work reasons.229 
After 1986, the SSN became important for tax and employment purposes due 
to the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (“IRCA”).230 This law 
makes it illegal to employ, or continue to employ, anyone who is not authorized to 
work in the United States.231 The IRCA prescribes civil and criminal penalties for 
employers who procure or retain employees in derogation of the express language 
of the statute.232 If strictly enforced, the IRCA would have the effect of preventing 
all undocumented immigrants from procuring employment in the United States. 
Since SSNs are usually only assigned to persons with authorization to work, the 
SSN is usually the first stop for employers seeking to verify prospective employees’ 
lawful authorization to work. In addition, the SSN is used by employers to remit 
income taxes and payroll tax withholdings.233 Unfortunately, for the undocumented 
immigrant seeking to earn a living, the realistic effect of the above requirements is 
that they must obtain a SSN through illegal means, furnish a false SSN, or work in 
the underground economy.234 
Aside from the necessity created by the IRCA, the SSN has become increas-
ingly important for claiming federal benefits such as social security and insurance 
benefits under the Affordable Care Act.235 In addition, certain refundable credits are 
available only to taxpayers who have SSNs.236 As indicated above, the difficulties 
caused by the requirement to obtain a SSN will have the effect of compelling a 
substantial number of undocumented immigrants—particularly those desperate for 
                                                          
 228. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN., SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER FOR NONCITIZENS (2018), 
https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10096.pdf (other legally protected statuses include refugees, asylees, 
and immigrants seeking protection from domestic violence, etc.). 
 229. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN., RM 10211.600, REQUESTS FOR AN SSN FROM AN ALIEN WITHOUT 
WORK AUTHORIZATION (2014), https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0110211600. The only valid non-
work reasons accepted by the SSA for issuing social security numbers are: 
(1) a Federal statute or regulation requires that the alien provide his or her social security number to get 
the particular benefit or service to which he or she has otherwise established entitlement; or 
(2) a state or local law requires the alien who is legally in the U.S. to provide his or her social security 
number to get public assistance benefits to which the alien has otherwise established entitlement and for 
which all other requirements have been met. 
However, these applications are subject to very stringent requirements including that an applicant submit 
a letter from the applicable government agency, specifically identifying the alien and signed in wet ink 
by the government official. SSA also verifies the authority and rank of the issuing official, as well as the 
veracity of the letter issued. See POMS, supra note 136. 
 230. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2004). 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. §§ 1324a(e)(4)(A), (f)(1). 
 233. ABILITY OF UNAUTHORIZED ALIENS, supra note 5, at 8. 
 234. Ronald W. Mortensen, Illegal but not Undocumented-Identity Theft, Document Fraud, and Illegal 
Employment, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (June 19, 2009), https://cis.org/Report/Illegal-Not-Undocu-
mented. 
 235. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, 42 U.S.C. § 18003 (2010) (the most notable 
provision in this regard is the Medicaid expansion which enables states to increase public access to 
Medicaid, but maintains the restriction imposed by the PRWORA). 
 236. ABILITY OF UNAUTHORIZED ALIENS, supra note 5, at 10 (such as the EITC). 
30
The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review, Vol. 2 [2018], Iss. 2, Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/betr/vol2/iss2/7
Iss. 2] Obiokoye: Taxation of Undocumented Immigrants 389 
employment—to either seek a SSN by any means, or to work in the underground 
economy and possibly engage in tax evasion as a matter of necessity. 
As of 2010, the OCACT estimates that 1.8 million immigrants worked while 
using a SSN that did not match their name,237 and “3.9 million other immigrants 
worked in the underground economy.”238 These statistics are indicative of the fact 
that a substantial amount of revenue is lost to the underground economy as a result 
of the rigorous requirements to obtain a SSN. While there is an underlying policy 
reason behind these laws—to discourage unlawful immigration by making it diffi-
cult for undocumented immigrants to obtain employment and benefits—a careful 
analysis of these laws may find that the benefits of permitting undocumented im-
migrants, or a class of them, to procure employment without these rigorous require-
ments may well exceed its costs. 
Apart from the evident effect of recapturing federal revenue, relaxing some of 
these requirements would: (1) benefit United States citizens in households headed 
by undocumented immigrants who would otherwise be unable to claim federal ben-
efits on account of their immigrant status; (2) tackle issues of unfairness raised by 
the Undocumented Immigrant Tax; and (3) substantially remove any motivation for 
individuals to engage in the unlawful act of tax evasion. At the very least, relaxing 
these requirements will eliminate those instances where such illegal activity stems 
out of a basic necessity to survive, as opposed to a voluntary desire to circumvent 
the law. 
Further, consider that some undocumented immigrants may be highly skilled 
professionals trying to escape hardships in their country of origin.239 These undoc-
umented immigrants may be forced to take whatever jobs they can find for suste-
nance,240 and so relaxing the requirements regarding the procurement of work au-
thorization and SSNs would result in at least a portion of these immigrants obtaining 
better employment. This will in turn reduce the burden on society by creating higher 
taxable incomes for such immigrants, reducing dependence on available emergency 
government benefits such as Medicaid, and most likely decreasing the number of 
undocumented immigrants who would otherwise be eligible for the ACTC due to 
their lower income bracket. 
As stated above, a substantial number of undocumented immigrants will report 
their income, regardless of the means by which it is procured, as a signal of good 
faith compliance with the law.241 The pertinent question considered in the subse-
quent parts, is whether the underlying illegal activity precipitated by the stringent 
regulation of such people could be justified against the benefit of such laws. An-
                                                          
 237. Goss et al., supra note 34, at 2. See ABILITY OF UNAUTHORIZED ALIENS, supra note 5, at 9 n.44 
(“In tax year 2006, 3.8% of the W-2 forms received had a name and/or identifying number that did not 
match the SSA records.”). 
 238. Goss et al., supra note 34, at 2. 
 239. Julia Preston, Immigrants Aren’t Taking Americans’ Jobs, New Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/22/us/immigrants-arent-taking-americans-jobs-new-
study-finds.html. 
 240. See Chris Huber et al., Syrian Refugee Crisis: Facts, FAQs, and How to Help, WORLD VISION, 
https://www.worldvision.org/refugees-news-stories/syrian-refugee-crisis-facts (last updated Nov. 19, 
2018) (for instance, refugees fleeing the Syrian crisis into the United States will be classified as undoc-
umented regardless of their skills or education until granted asylee or refugee status); see also Jason 
Richwine, High-Skill Immigrants in Low-Skill Jobs, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (July 12, 2018), 
https://cis.org/Report/HighSkill-Immigrants-LowSkill-Jobs. 
 241. See supra Part III.C. 
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other equally important question is whether these restrictions frustrate the underly-
ing policy behind the Code—to treat all individuals the same regardless of their 
immigration status.242 
Current tax laws and IRS policies have attempted to create certain safe havens 
to enable undocumented immigrants to report their income without fear of re-
prisal.243 However, other reasons exist for reconsidering how tax and immigration 
laws interconnect to create a systemic disadvantage for undocumented immigrants 
compared to others. 
B.   The Social Security Number as a Means of Immigration 
Control: Shield or Spade? 
When people think of work authorization requirements, particularly the need 
to keep SSNs out of undocumented immigrants’ hands, the overall feeling is that of 
protection.244 It is a shield, so to speak, that keeps citizens and lawful residents safe 
from unwanted competition, and it preserves jobs while keeping government bene-
fits in taxpayers’ hands.245 
However, as discussed above, many undocumented immigrants are taxpayers. 
More importantly, they are human beings with all the basic needs generic to the 
human race, such as food, clothing, shelter, and the need to provide financial sup-
port for loved ones.246 Therefore, an important point to consider is whether these 
laws are simultaneously condemning others to an unending cycle of illegal activity. 
As mentioned above, one of the most notorious uses of the SSN is in employ-
ment verification.247 This means that at the starting point of the employment pro-
cess, employers will request SSNs for tax reasons and to verify work authorization. 
The fact that undocumented immigrants are ordinarily excluded from obtaining 
SSNs or work authorization creates an avenue for the exploitation of such individ-
uals.248 Thus, undocumented immigrants are often underpaid,249 denied workplace 
protections,250 and denied compensation for injuries suffered in the work place.251 
Opportunistic employers take advantage of their fear of deportation by denying 
them rights that are available to other people in the work place.252 While courts have 
                                                          
 242. See supra Part I for a discussion of how the Code reflects the “Ideal Tax World” scenario. 
 243. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7213 (2016) (making unauthorized disclosure of federal tax return information 
a felony). 
 244. See, e.g., TIGTA REPORT, supra note 184, at 2. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Saul McLeod, Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs, SIMPLY PSYCHOL., https://www.simplypsychol-
ogy.org/simplypsychology.org-Maslows-Hierarchy-of-Needs.pdf (last updated May 2018). 
 247. See supra Part VI.A.ii. 
 248. See, e.g., Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700, 701 (11th Cir. 1988). 
 249. Id. (sometimes below the minimum wage or not at all); see also Daniel Costa, Employers Exploit 
Unauthorized Immigrants to Keep Wages Low, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/roomforde-
bate/2015/09/03/is-immigration-really-a-problem-in-the-us/employers-exploit-unauthorized-immi-
grants-to-keep-wages-low (last updated Sept. 3, 2015, 3:30 AM). 
 250. Patel, 846 F.2d at 701; see also Sure-Tan, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 467 U.S. 883, 892 (1984); Lori A. 
Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace: The Fallacy of Labor Protection and the Need for 
Reform, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 345, 347 (2001). 
 251. Sure-Tan, Inc., 467 U.S. at 901; Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 6 N.Y.3d 338, 350, 812 N.Y.S.2d 
416 (2006); Asylum Co. v. D.C. Dep’t of Employment Servs., 10 A.3d 619, 625 (D.C. 2010). 
 252. Patel, 846 F.2d at 701. 
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consistently held that these rights are equally available to undocumented employ-
ees,253 such abuses will continue as more undocumented immigrants would rather 
bear these abuses than seek relief through litigation or law enforcement, which may 
lead to deportation.254 
These requirements also provide a favorable breeding ground for human traf-
ficking and the underground slave trade, as undocumented immigrants are easy prey 
to predators offering employment in return for cash.255 Unfortunately, undocu-
mented immigrants are also much less likely to report crimes against their person 
to law enforcement authorities for fear of deportation, which will create enforce-
ment problems in these areas.256 
Further, while there is technically no legal restriction for undocumented immi-
grants to own their own business, most traditional loans will require a valid SSN or 
proof of legal immigrant status in order to qualify.257 A similar requirement exists 
for credit card applications and mortgage loans from reputable banks.258 Where such 
loans are available, they are usually more costly.259 Therefore, in most cases, busi-
nesses owned by undocumented immigrants are limited to whatever size the indi-
vidual can manage through loans from friends, family, or from usurious lending 
sources. Usurious lending services should be of greater concern, since desperation 
will force these individuals to accept whatever financing is available, regardless of 
the cost.260 Desperation will also hinder an undocumented immigrant from reporting 
usurious behavior, for fear of being given up to immigration authorities. 
Once again, this raises a signaling problem. If unfair conditions exist that treat 
undocumented immigrants differently from American citizens, then such immi-
grants will not feel accepted within their community. In the long term, feeling un-
accepted will erode the desire for undocumented immigrants to conform to social                                                           
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norms—of which tax compliance is an important part. Needless to say, tax evasion 
is itself a criminal offense.261 
Additionally, in the area of identity theft, as with any activity that confers eco-
nomic advantage, demand fuels supply. Many undocumented immigrants have fam-
ily members both within and outside the U.S. that need support. Because they will 
not be eligible for government benefits, such as food stamps, these people will resort 
to whatever means necessary to obtain employment in order to sustain their loved 
ones. Accordingly, people who may not otherwise be inclined to engage in illegal 
activity will seek out persons willing to assist them in procuring SSNs, in order to 
secure employment or financing to support their loved ones. Just like the demand 
for transplant organs has given rise to a booming human trafficking market in some 
parts of the world,262 stringent restrictions on the ability of undocumented immi-
grants to procure lawful employment, without exceptions, will drive the demand for 
identity theft. 
Finally, there seems to be some consensus that areas of the economy in which 
undocumented immigrants tend to work are areas of high demand.263 As a result, 
blue-collar employers are all too ready to ignore perceived problems with SSN ver-
ification in favor of procuring much needed labor.264 One could therefore argue that 
there is also a net increase in the number of employers who are forced to engage in 
illegal activity as a result of the indirect effect of these laws. For these employers, 
the reality is that the economic benefit and ready availability of much needed work-
ers, including the increase in revenue represented by such earnings, would often 
outweigh the cost of trying to limit the ability of such workers to earn a liveli-
hood.265 
All of the above hardships call for the reconsideration of the processes and 
qualifications for obtaining SSNs. If SSNs were accessible to certain well-defined 
classes of undocumented immigrants, this would curtail many of the injustices de-
scribed above and help a large number of people break out from the cycle of forced 
illegal activity. Further, just like the DAPA program, such initiatives would provide 
positive signaling to the undocumented immigrant community, which would en-
courage not just tax compliance, but also the desire to comply with other relevant 
social norms within their community. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The analysis above discloses a number of important things. First, undocu-
mented immigrants, as a whole, currently bring about a net benefit in tax revenue. 
Accordingly, federal action that tends to encourage this class of taxpayers to engage 
in greater self-reporting without fear of immigration reprisals will increase revenue                                                           
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derived from taxation. Similarly, initiatives that aim to encourage gainful employ-
ment of undocumented immigrants, as opposed to suppressing job opportunities, 
would result in both an economic benefit of increased revenue and Gross Domestic 
Product (“GDP”) and a social benefit of reducing the incidence of illegal activity 
provoked by such laws. Assuming there is a relationship between the demand for 
labor supply in certain industries—such as construction—and the rate at which un-
documented immigrants obtain employment using non-matching SSNs, then it 
could be concluded that undocumented immigrants serve the purpose of providing 
equilibrium in the workforce, thereby reducing the cost of labor across several in-
dustries. 
Second, immigration reform that enables more undocumented immigrants to 
obtain work authorization, subject to compliance with other applicable laws, would 
serve a positive signaling purpose by showing these individuals that the government 
has a low discount rate, which will have the effect of reinforcing positive compli-
ance behavior. Similarly, issuing work authorizations to more undocumented im-
migrants would induct those individuals into the mainstream of society and increase 
their desire to conform to mainstream social norms, including better tax reporting 
behavior. 
If SSNs were accessible by certain well-defined classes of undocumented im-
migrants, this would also curtail the number of instances where people feel com-
pelled to procure these numbers through unlawful means. This would thereby re-
duce incidents of fraud, identity theft, and other related criminal offences that occur 
as a result of the current restrictions.266 Reliance on emergency medical services 
and benefits, such as the ACTC, would also be reduced by such policies. Similarly, 
there is currently a high incentive for undocumented entrepreneurs to take financing 
where they can find it and to leave usury unreported. Again, this results in a net 
increase in illegal lending activities which could be forestalled through more 
friendly immigration legislation and enforcement. 
There is no doubt that stringent immigration enforcement, similar to the ideal 
legal world scenario, would eliminate some of the concerns associated with illegal 
immigration into the U.S. However, statistics indicate that such strategy would be 
costly to the U.S.—perhaps costlier than any benefit that could be derived from the 
same.267 Apart from driving the existing undocumented immigrant population to the 
underground economy, it is estimated that it would cost between $400–600 billion 
for the DHS to remove all undocumented immigrants in the United States (more 
than 11.3 million people) over the next 20 years.268 
Additionally, “The Bipartisan Policy Center [estimates] that deporting all unauthor-
ized immigrants would shrink the labor force by 6.4% over the course of two dec-
ades.”269 Further, the American Action Forum estimates that this would decrease 
United States GDP “by a full $1.6 trillion.”270 By contrast, “putting unauthorized 
immigrants on a pathway to citizenship—which two-thirds of Americans support—                                                          
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would add . . . $1.2 trillion to the GDP over a decade, increase the earnings of all 
Americans by $625 billion, and create an average of 145,000 new jobs each 
year.”271 
This article does not suggest that all undocumented immigrants should be un-
conditionally permitted to obtain work authorization in the United States. However, 
a more desirable approach to the problem of illegal immigration would be to com-
bine stricter law enforcement at the borders with policies, such as DAPA, aimed at 
enabling undocumented immigrants already in the country272 to obtain work author-
ization and SSNs if they comply with the requirements of then-existing tax and 
criminal laws. Apart from the significant signaling effect and the attendant tax com-
pliance response that such initiatives tend to generate, such policies will give nu-
merous displaced and disadvantaged undocumented immigrants, currently being 
forced into various levels of illegal activity, a real chance at integrating within the 
larger society. And, needless to say, the over 4 million United States citizen children 
who form part of this class will finally receive the protection that they deserve.273 
Finally, fairness and equity considerations support continuing to allow undoc-
umented immigrants to claim refundable tax credits (including the ACTC), since 
current tax laws purport to be neutral in classifying taxpayers, without regard to 
immigration status. As discussed in the preceding parts, tax laws that are perceived 
to be unfair have a negative signaling effect that invites non-compliance. Even more 
so, where such laws result in certain United States citizens (children of undocu-
mented parents) being treated differently from other United States citizens in simi-
lar economic circumstances, solely on account of their parentage. Accordingly, a 
more thoughtful approach to tax and immigration legislation and policies is war-
ranted, especially where such laws or policies have the additional effect of compel-
ling undocumented immigrants to engage in illegal activity. 
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